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PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
MARK C. WEBER*
The minority portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court' begins with a reci-
tation of the purposeful availment requirement: the minimum
contacts sufficient to permit a court to exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant must be those the defendant has purpose-
fully established. Under the purposeful availment requirement,
the relevant contacts are those related to the defendant's activi-
ties within the forum state that might be viewed as invoking the
benefits and protections of the state's laws.2 Justice Brennan's
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1975, Columbia Uni-
versity; J.D. 1978, Yale Law School.
I thank my colleagues Bruce Ottley and Vincent Vitullo for their comments on an
early draft. I also thank my research assistants, Stephen Chan and James Holden, who
played an invaluable role in assemblying and analyzing the cases found in sections I-B-2-
4 and I-C-2.
1. -U.S-, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). The case arose out of a motorcycle accident in
California. Plaintiff claimed that a blowout in the rear tire of his motorcycle made him
lose control and collide with a tractor. He was severely injured; his wife, a passenger, was
killed. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the tire tube, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial
Company, which cross-complained for indemnity from the other defendants and from
Asahi Metal Industry Company, the manufacturer of the tire tube's valve assembly.
Plaintiff settled with Cheng Shin and the other defendants, leaving only Cheng Shin's
indemnity claim against Asahi. The California Supreme Court approved the exercise of
jurisdiction by reversing the state court of appeals' entry of a writ of mandate command-
ing the superior court to grant the motion quashing the summons. Id. at 1029-30.
2. Justice O'Connor articulated the minimum contacts test as follows:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "[T]he
constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed.2d 528
(1985), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.
Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed.2d 195 (1945). Most recently, we have ieaffirmed the oft-
quoted reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239,
2 L. Ed.2d 1283 (1958), that minimum contacts must have a basis in "some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. at 2183. "Jurisdiction is
proper ... where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defend-
1
Weber: Purposeful Availment
Published by Scholar Commons, 1988
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
concurrence also endorsed this requirement,3 while Justice Ste-
vens's concurrence did not take issue with it.4 Despite this seem-
ing unanimity, the central dispute in Asahi may be described as
a dispute over purposeful availment. The faction of the Court
led by Justice O'Connor believed that putting a consumer prod-
uct in the stream of commerce, without more, did not constitute
purposeful availment of the benefits of the states that the prod-
uct entered." On the other hand, the faction led by Justice Bren-
nan believed that the purposeful availment test was met in
Asahi.6
While the Court has had many disagreements over the
proper scope of territorial jurisdiction, 7 and scholars have criti-
cized both the minimum contacts test in general and many as-
pects of its application,8 neither the Court nor the scholars have
ant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State." Ibid.,
quoting McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.
Ct. 199, 201, 2 L. Ed.2d 225 (1957) (emphasis in original).
107 S. Ct. at 1031 (emphasis added). Thus, the purposeful availment requirement is that
the defendant to whom the minimum contacts test is to be applied will not be vulnerable
to suit unless it has deliberately established contacts with the state that has given it
some benefit from activities that have taken place within the state. See Hanson, 357 U.S.
at 253,
3. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Brennan opinion garnered three
other votes (Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun), while the minority portion of the
O'Connor opinion also had four votes (Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Powell, and
Scalia). A separate concurrence by Justice Stevens also attracted the votes of Justices
White and Blackmun.
4. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 1033.
6. Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring). The concurrence stated, nevertheless, that
the forum state, California, could not properly assert territorial jurisdiction because of
considerations other than the test of purposefully created minimum contacts.
7. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
8. A few of the most recent articles on territorial jurisdiction in general and mini-
mum contacts in particular are Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substan-
tive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALiF. L. REV. 1 (1986);
Hay, Refining Personal Jurisdiction in the United States, 35 INT'L & CO&IP. L.Q. 32
(1986); Perdue, Sin, Scandal and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987); Perschbacher, Minimum Contacts
Reapplied. Mr. Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzwicz,
1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585; Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due
Process Determination of Jurisdiction Over the Person, 59 TMmP. L.Q. 47 (1986); Stein,
Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65
TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987); Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes,
23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55 (1988). Two scholars have recently engaged in a debate over the
2
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given close critical attention to the purposeful availment aspect
of the minimum contacts test. The time is ripe for an evaluation
of purposeful availment.
Although the requirement is in no danger from the current
Court,9 significant developments in territorial jurisdiction doc-
trine over recent years suggest that perhaps it ought to be. The
most important of these developments hag been the Court's re-
treat from concepts of federalism and state territorial sover-
eignty in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee' and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 11 In Hanson
v. Denckla,'2 which originated the purposeful availment require-
ment, the Court reasoned that territorial limits on the sover-
eignty of the states restrict the otherwise all reaching power of
the forum over every case in which litigation was not inconve-
nient or overly distant.'3 If sovereignty is no longer a proper
concern in territorial jurisdiction disputes, then a purposeful
scope of "general" and "specific" jurisdiction based on minimum contacts. Professor
Twitchell opened with The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
Professor Brilmayer responded in Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1444 (1988), and Professor Twitchell replied in A Rejoinder to Professor
"Brilmayer, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1465 (1988).
9. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
10. 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982).
11. 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985).
12. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
13. Id. at 251. Of course, Hanson places its exposition of the limits on state territo-
rial sovereignty before its recitation of the minimum contacts requirement, suggesting
that minimum contacts itself is a doctrine tied to state sovereignty ideas. The Court's
meaning, however, appears to have been somewhat more restrictive. It viewed state sov-
ereignty ideas as a further limit on jurisdiction when the proper tests would otherwise be
only convenience and distance. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), which originated the minimum contacts test, the Court placed distance and con-
venience factors within the minimum contacts inquiry:
Those demands [of due process in the exercise of jurisdiction] may be met by
such contacts of the [defendant] corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to re-
quire the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An
"estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from a
trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection.
Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
Thus, the Court in Hanson seemed to find a second strand within minimum contacts,
separating the ideas of distance and convenience from those of state territorial sover-
eignty. The state sovereignty ideas became the basis of the requirement that the mini-
mum contacts (the test of distance and convenience) be purposefully created by the de-
fendant (the test of state territorial sovereignty).
3
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availment analysis may not be proper either.
This Article examines the purposeful availment requirement
and questions whether it is consistent with sound judicial rea-
soning, particularly in light of the developments in other aspects
of territorial jurisdiction doctrine. Part One describes the origins
and history of purposeful availment. Part Two examines the
doctrine's theoretical basis and the development that has taken
place around it. Part Three evaluates purposeful availment in
light of theoretical developments. This Article concludes with
suggestions for a change in the application of the purposeful
availment requirement.
I. THE HISTORY OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
A. Hanson v. Denckla
The purposeful availment requirement originated in Han-
son v. Denckla.14 In Hanson the Court considered a Florida
judgment that had invalidated appointments from a trust whose
trustee was in Delaware. 5 The settlor created the trust in Dela-
ware while she was a Pennsylvania resident. She then moved to
Florida, and five years later appointed $200,000 from the Dela-
ware trust to each of two previously established trusts whose
trustee was also in Delaware. 6 The settlor also corresponded
with the trustee of the Delaware trust to change the trust advi-
sor's compensation and to revoke the trust in the amount of
$75,000 for an eight-month period.' 7 When the settlor died, two
legatees under the residuary clause of her will, who had already
received $500,000 each, petitioned a Florida chancery court for a
declaratory judgment that the funds from the Delaware trust
passed under the residuary clause and that the previous ap-
pointments to the two trusts were, therefore, invalid.'"
14. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
15. Id. at 238.
16. Id. at 239.
17. Id. at 252 n.24.
18. Id. at 240. The plaintiffs sued and personally served the executrix of the will, the
beneficiaries, and all but one of the potential beneficiaries of the trusts. Other defend-
ants, not residents of Florida and not personally served (but nevertheless notified of the
action), included the Delaware trust companies that were the trustees of the main trust,
the two trusts that received the appointment, several individual appointees whose ap-
pointments were made at the same time as those to the two trusts, and various potential
818 [Vol. 39
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss4/4
PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
The beneficiaries of the trusts to which the appointments
were made contended that the suit had to be dismissed because
the Delaware trustees were indispensable parties to litigation
over the validity of the trust and were outside the territorial ju-
risdiction of Florida. The trial court dismissed the action against
the trust companies, but held that it retained the ability to adju-
dicate the case. The court concluded that the appointments were
invalid because they were testamentary. Reversing the dismissal
of the trust companies, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that
the Florida courts had jurisdiction over the trust companies and
other absent defendants. The court, however, affirmed the trial
court's decision that the trust was invalid and the appointments
ineffective because the settlor retained too much control over
the trustee and corpus. 19
While the Florida litigation was pending in the trial court,
the executrix of the will began a declaratory judgment action in
Delaware against the Florida plaintiffs and the trust companies.
* The Florida court enjoined the executrix's action. The benefi-
ciaries of the two trusts to which the appointments were made,
however, pursued the matter and obtained a judgment that the
trust and appointments were valid, despite the contention that
the Florida decree, which by then had been entered, was res
judicata. The Florida Supreme Court was not persuaded by the
executrix's argument that she was bound by the Delaware de-
cree. Although the executrix contended in rehearing that the
Florida court was bound by the full faith and credit clause, the
court denied rehearing on November 28, 1956. The Florida
plaintiffs were equally unsuccessful in their argument that the
Delaware courts had to accord full faith and credit to the deci-
sions of the Florida courts. The Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed the Delaware chancellor's decision on January 14, 1957.20
successors to the plaintiffs' interest. Only two of the nonresident defendants appeared,
and they were potential successors to the plaintiffs. Id. at 241.
19. Id. at 238-39. The trust was composed of securities. The settlor had reserved the
income from the securities for life. The remainder of this income was to be paid to the
persons she was to appoint by inter vivos or testamentary means. The settlor had re-
tained a great deal of control. She could change the trustee and amend or revoke the
agreement at any time. Moreover, the trustee could sell assets; make investments; and
participate in plans, proceedings, reorganizations, and mergers involving securities in the
trust only with the consent of a "trust advisor" appointed by the settlor. Id. at 238-39.
20. Id. at 242-43. The United States Supreme Court refused to consider whether the
Florida court erred in refusing to give full faith and credit to the Delaware trial court
19881
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware
court and reversed the Florida court. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion began by disposing of the contention that the Florida
court had in rem jurisdiction over the proceeding." Warren next
distinguished the latest territorial jurisdiction pronouncement of
the Court, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,2 2 on the
ground that the cause of action in McGee arose out of conduct
in the forum state.2 3 The Court then announced a new version of
the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington:
24
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
judgment because the question was not presented to the Florida Supreme Court until
the motion for rehearing. Id. at 244 & n.4.
21. Id. at 246-50. The Court held that the mere probating of a will in Florida did
not give rise to jurisdiction over disputes regarding inter vivos transfers of property that
would otherwise pass under the will. "If such a basis of jurisdiction were sustained, pro-
bate courts would enjoy nationwide service of process to adjudicate interests in property
with which neither the State nor the decedent could claim any affiliation." Id. at 248-49.
The Court also held that the presence of the original owner of the property, the dece-
dent, in the jurisdiction did not confer in rem jurisdiction under traditional doctrine. Id.
at 249. Finally, the Court held that improper assertion of extraterritorial in rem jurisdic-
tion, like improper assertion of extraterritorial in personam jurisdiction, violates due
process. Id. at 250.
22. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). McGee was decided in the same Term as Hanson. In Mc-
Gee plaintiff sued in California over a life insurance policy that had been reissued by a
Texas insurance company that had taken over the business of an Arizona company, the
issuer of the original policy. Id. at 221. The Supreme Court held that California could
assert jurisdiction, even though the Texas company did no business there except ob-
taining the premiums on that single policy. The Court applied the reasoning of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and concluded that the insurance
contract and the performance under it were sufficient relations with the forum to uphold
jurisdiction. 355 U.S. at 223. The Court further noted that California had an obvious
interest in protecting its residents, and while the defendant was inconvenienced, the in-
convenience did not amount to a due process denial. Id. at 223-24. By contrast, a benefi-
ciary with a small or moderate claim would not be able to afford to litigate elsewhere. Id.
at 223.
23. 357 U.S. at 251-52.
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe concerned contributions to an unem-
ployment insurance fund of the State of Washington. The company employed salesmen
in Washington, but had no permanent office there. Contracts were approved and goods
shipped elsewhere. The Court held that in personam jurisdiction existed in Washington
on the theory that the company had minimum contacts with the state. The Court articu-
lated the minimum contacts test without overruling earlier territorial jurisdiction cases,
which had relied on Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and rules derived from it. See
infra text accompanying notes 31-42.
6
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vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity,
but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.25
If the issue had been simply the validity of the appointments,
then the execution of the power of the appointment under which
the appointees were claiming rights might have been an ade-
quate contact.26 The validity of the trust agreement, however,
was the real issue: the argument was that the trust was testa-
mentary, not that the appointment had been improper under
the terms of the trust. The exercise of the power of appointment
did not relate to the real controversy.27 Thus, the defendant
trustee did not purposefully create contact with Florida, and
hence the Florida court had improperly exercised jurisdiction.2 8
The Court ruled that jurisdiction over the trustee was cru-
cial to the validity of the Florida judgment. Although the vari-
ous appointees and beneficiaries who lived in Florida conceded
jurisdiction, Florida adhered to the rule that the trustee is an
indispensable party in actions regarding the validity of trusts,29
so the action fell. The Court declared that even though all of the
interested claimants were domiciled in Florida, the court still
lacked jurisdiction over the trustee:
As we understand [Florida's] law, the trustee is an indispensa-
ble party over whom the court must acquire jurisdiction before
it is empowered to enter judgment in a proceeding affecting the
validity of a trust. It does not acquire that jurisdiction by being
the "center of gravity" of the controversy, or the most conven-
ient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction,
25. 357 U.S. at 253.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 253-54. Although Justice Black and two other dissenters disputed this
point, see id. at 256 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting), the Florida Supreme Court's language
supports Justice Warren's interpretation. Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 383-85
(Fla. 1956), rev'd, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CM. L. REv. 569,
620 n.273 (1958).
28. 357 U.S. at 253-54.
29. Id. at 245. There was some disagreement over this issue in the Black dissent as
well. Black found evidence in the Florida caselaw that held adherence to the rule was not
absolute and stated that the action should have been remanded to the Florida Supreme
Court to see whether it would have applied the rule. Id. at 261-62 (Black, J., dissenting).
1988]
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not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by considering the
acts of the trustee. As we have indicated, they are insufficient
to sustain jurisdiction.
30
Thus, the Court created and applied the purposeful avail-
ment test and rejected the competing idea of comparing jurisdic-
tion to choice of law and adopting tests based solely on conve-
nience or interests in the litigation.
B. Origins of Purposeful Availment
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
Although an explicit purposeful availment requirement sud-
denly sprang into being in one Supreme Court decision, the
Court believed that it was merely filling in the details of the
minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton. 1 In fact International Shoe was the only case the Court
cited in its two paragraphs on the purposeful availment require-
ment.3 2 International Shoe, however, neither explained nor in
any clear way applied the language on which Hanson relied:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privi-
lege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obliga-
tions arise out of or are connected with the activities within the
state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to
a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly
be said to be undue.
33
This language suggests a number of different ideas, any
combination of which might fairly be taken as the antecedent of
the purposeful availment requirement. One idea is fairness in
the sense of reciprocity: the defendant has availed itself of bene-
fits and protections afforded by the state's law and, therefore, it
is a reasonable quid pro quo for the defendant to be subject to
jurisdiction in the courts in which the state enforces its law.
This idea is intuitively appealing; consistent with the functional,
30. Id. at 254 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted).
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. 357 U.S. at 253-54.
33. 326 U.S. at 319.
[Vol. 39
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fairness-oriented spirit of International Shoe; and directly ap-
plicable to International Shoe's facts. In that case, the defend-
ant company's salesmen lived in Washington state and carried
on business activities they could hardly have executed without
the protection of the state's laws and law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, if the company laid off any salesmen, the salesmen
could receive state unemployment compensation benefits, which
were the purpose of the tax that the state was attempting to
enforce. Although the unemployment compensation ran to the
employee, the benefits' availability aided the company by elimi-
nating the need to establish a guaranteed wage or severance sys-
tem, or to increase wages to make up for the lack of such a
system.
Nevertheless, International Shoe's hint that the fairness of
reciprocity is the source of a purposeful availment test is incon-
sistent with the application of the purposeful availment require-
ment in Hanson v. Denckla. As Justice Douglas pointed out in
dissent, the trustee in Hanson was a mere stakeholder. 4 The
trustee could not use the trust proceeds for its own benefit. The
court was not imposing on the trustee any liability beyond the
trust proceeds. When an entity has no real interest in a contro-
versy, deciding the dispute in its absence is perfectly fair. The
trustee may have gained little from Florida's laws, but it was not
losing anything by the exercise of Florida's jurisdiction. Al-
though Florida retained the old equity rule of requiring the
presence of the trustee in any action concerning the validity of a
trust, the Court never doubted that Florida could have dis-
pensed with the rule.3 5 The Court never suggested that its deci-
sion upheld any tangible fairness interest of the trustee.
The fairness of reciprocity is thus an incomplete source for
the purposeful availment requirement. In the case that
originated the requirement, no apparent reciprocity existed, but
there was no apparent unfairness to the absent defendant. The
34. Justice Douglas stated:
So far as the present controversy is concerned the trustee was purely and sim-
ply a stakeholder or an agent holding assets of the settlor to dispose of as she
designated. . . . We must remember this is not a suit to impose liability on the
Delaware trustee or on any other absent person. It is merely a suit to deter-
mine interests in those intangibles.
357 U.S. at 263 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 245 (majority opinion), 262 (Black, J., dissenting).
1988]
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source of the rule must be sought at a deeper level.
The part of International Shoe cited by the Hanson Court
relied on several authorities. 6 As Professor Kurland has pointed
out, the caselaw from the period between Pennoyer v. Nefp7 and
International Shoe that expanded in personam jurisdiction over
corporations (the immediate subject of International Shoe) falls
into two categories: cases that applied a fiction of constructive
consent by the defendant to the assertion of jurisdiction, and
cases that applied a fiction of presence within the jurisdiction by
the defendant.3 s The authorities cited in International Shoe fall
into both categories,39 thus suggesting that purposeful avail-
ment's antecedents are both the doctrine of constructive pres-
ence and of constructive consent. Under constructive consent,
the defendant's purposeful availment of the benefits and protec-
tions of the forum's laws would be an indication of its consent to
the exercise of the forum's jurisdiction. Similarly, under con-
structive presence, the defendant's purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections of the forum's laws would be an indica-
tion that the defendant was actually, though not physically, pre-
sent in the forum.
The return to these fictions is consistent with Hanson's idea
of inherent territorial restrictions on the power of the states.40 In
Hanson the Court believed that this sovereignty concept was the
36. The passage from International Shoe, quoted supra text accompanying note 33,
concludes:
Compare International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, [234 U.S. 579 (1914),] with
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., [205 U.S. 530 (1907),] and People's Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co. [,246 U.S. 79 (1918)]. Compare Connecticut Mu-
tual Co. v. Spratley, [172 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1899),] and Commercial Mutual
Co. v. Davis, [213 U.S. 245 (1909),] with Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough
[,204 U.S. 8 (1907)]. See [Note, What Constitutes Doing Business by a Foreign
Corporation for Purposes of Jurisdiction?,] 29 Columbia Law Review, 187-95
[(1929)].
326 U.S. at 319.
37. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
38. Kurland, supra note 27, at 578.
39. The following cases applied constructive presence: People's Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914); Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). These
cases applied constructive consent: Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245
(1909); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
40. A return was necessary because recent caselaw had not applied sovereignty
ideas. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
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basis of the minimum contacts requirement and was the reason
that the requirement applies even when the burden of defending
in a distant forum is minimal.4 The Supreme Court cases after
International Shoe had conspicuously ignored this idea of state
territorial sovereignty.
42
2. The Consent Cases
To find the origin of purposeful availment in the old con-
structive consent doctrine seems logical.43 The whole idea of
41. Hanson stated:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that [the recent] trend [towards flexible jurisdic-
tional standards] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal
the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called
upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
357 U.S. at 251 (citation omitted).
42. See infra note 160.
43. In Shaffer v. Heitner the Court analyzed purposeful availment in terms of juris-
diction by consent:
[Plaintiff's] line of reasoning . . . does not demonstrate that appellants have
"purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State," Hanson v. Denckla, [357 U.S. 235,] 253 [(1958),] in a
way that would justify bringing them before [the forum state's] tribunal. Ap-
pellants have simply had nothing to do with the State. . . . Moreover, appel-
lants had no reason to expect to be haled before [the forum state's] court. [The
forum state], unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats accept-
ance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State. And "[iut strains
reason . . . to suggest that anyone buying securities in a corporation formed
[there] 'impliedly consents' to subject himself to [the state's] . . . jurisdiction
on any cause of action." Folk & Moyer, [Sequestration in Delaware: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 749,] 785 [(1973)].
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Likewise, Professor Kur-
land, writing shortly after the Hanson decision, analyzed Hanson's revision of the mini-
mum contacts test, particularly its distinction of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957), in constructive consent terms. He stated that the opinion might
mean a return to the jurisdictional standards that Professor Austin Scott criticized in his
early articles on constructive consent, Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists,
39 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1926), and Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business
within a State, 32 HARv. L. REv. 871 (1919). Kurland, supra note 27, at 622. Also perti-
nent is the statement of Professor Stein: "The Court in Hanson developed modern doc-
trine, which . . . insists upon consensual affiliation by the defendant with the forum."
Stein, supra note 8, at 717 (1987); see also Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and
Political Theory, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 293, 306 (1987) (tying purposeful availment to
consent).
11
Weber: Purposeful Availment
Published by Scholar Commons, 1988
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
consent implies purposeful action that is undertaken for some
gain or other rational reason. If no jurisdiction existed over the
out-of-state defendant without that defendant's consent, the
question would focus on what conduct manifests the consent.
The likely answer would be that consent may be inferred from
conduct undertaken deliberately for the defendant's own gain.
Purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the fo-
rum's laws is prototypical constructive consent. Stated alterna-
tively, a court analyzing whether a defendant consents to juris-
diction might ask if the defendant purposefully availed itself of
the benefits and protections of the forum's laws.
The doctrine of constructive consent to personal jurisdiction
began in the era of strict territorial limits on in personam juris-
diction, when courts examined whether anything in defendant's
conduct justified an exception to these limits. 4 The Court in La-
fayette Insurance Co. v. French45 used language similar to lan-
guage in International Shoe and Hanson analyzing the contacts
that justified the assertion of jurisdiction over the out-of-state
defendant. In Lafayette the Court held: "when this corporation
sent its agent into Ohio, with authority to make contracts of in-
surance, the corporation must be taken to assent to the condi-
tion ... that an agent, to make contracts, should also be the
agent of the corporation to receive service of process in suits on
such contracts. ' 46 Lafayette assumed that, because the state
possessed the right to exclude the foreign corporation, the corpo-
ration could not do business within a state unless the state con-
sented to the corporation's actions.4 The Court held that the
44. Before passage of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
courts applying these restrictions viewed them as a common law-based exception to the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, art. IV, § 1, cl. 4. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 408.
47. The Court in Layfayette stated:
A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the
consent, express or implied, of the latter state. . . .This consent may be ac-
companied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose; and these con-
ditions must be deemed valid and effectual by other States, and by this court,
provided they are not repugnant to the constitution of laws of the United
States....
° ° I ,
...Now, when this corporation sent its agent into Ohio, with authority to
make contracts of insurance there, the corporation must be taken to assent to
[Vol. 39
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forum state could condition admittance into the state upon the
corporation's consent to be sued in the forum state on related
causes of action.48
In 1882 the Court greatly expanded the Lafayette approach
of determining when a foreign corporation consents to jurisdic-
tion. In St. Clair v. Cox4" the Court focused not on whether the
corporation sent its agent into the state, but on whether the cor-
poration transacted business within the forum state.50 Doing
business in a forum state was presumed to be assent to the con-
ditions of the laws of the state, including the applicability of ju-
risdiction. 1 In the absence of express consent, implied consent
to accept state court jurisdiction was inferred from the corpora-
tion's doing business within the forum state.
By 1895, the Court acknowledged that "doing business" was
the consenting corporate conduct minimally required to subject
a corporation to jurisdiction.2 Doing business became a measure
by which courts determined whether a corporation's voluntary
activities were sufficient to subject the corporation to jurisdic-
tion. 3 As in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Sprat-
ley, 54 this implied consent continued even after the foreign cor-
poration retracted its agents from the forum state. Having taken
on the risks in the issuance of insurance policies, the corporation
did not cease doing business by refusing to take on new risks
while keeping the original policies in force.55
the condition ... that an agent, to make contracts, should also be the agent of
the corporation to receive service of process in suits on such contracts ...
Id. at 407-08.
48. Id.
49. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
50. "[I]t is essential, in order to support the jurisdiction of the court to render a
personal judgment, that it should appear. . . that the corporation was engaged in busi-
ness in the State. . . [that] would. . . be sufficient prima facie evidence that the agent
represented the company in the business." Id. at 359.
51. See, e.g., Ex Parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 376 (1877) ("[The foreign corpo-
ration] had in effect consented to be sued there, in consideration of its being permitted
by Congress to exercise therein its corporate powers and privileges.").
52. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 519-20 (1895).
53. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 227 (1913) ("[Tihe business must
be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has
subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district.").
54. 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
55. The Court wrote:
Continuing to do business, the company impliedly assented to the terms of
that statute, at least to the extent of consenting to the service of process upon
19881 827
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The express consent to jurisdiction pursuant to a state stat-
ute could confer personal jurisdiction even for suits unrelated to
the foreign corporation's business in the forum state. In Penn-
sylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co.56 a state
statute requiring the corporation's filing of the power of attorney
could have been construed to confer additional jurisdictional
power to the state over all suits against the corporation. The
Court suggested that a corporation was held to have impliedly
consented to appointment to accept service not because of pres-
ence or of actual consent, but because the corporation had done
business voluntarily.
57
In Flexner v. Farson68 the Court acknowledged in dicta that
the implied consent found in corporation cases was a mere fic-
tion. The Court had to recognize that a state was limited in its
power to exclude foreign corporations. If a corporation could en-
gage in business without the state's permission, the corporation
had no obligation to submit to conditions on entry into the
state. In addition, a foreign corporation refusing to comply with
a state's corporation laws would be better protected than a com-
pliant corporation if the state could acquire personal jurisdiction
over the compliant corporations regarding unrelated causes of
an agent so far representative in character that the law would imply authority
on his part to receive such service within the state.
Id. at 619. The defendant life insurance company, which incorporated and had its princi-
pal office in Connecticut, had complied with foreign corporation laws in Tennessee, but
later ceased issuing new policies, withdrew its agents, and notified the state insurance
commission of its withdrawal. The company, however, continued receiving premium pay-
ments on outstanding policies. Id. at 607. In general, the implied consent allowed contin-
uing jurisdiction over related causes of action although a foreign corporation had left.
The Court used implied consent to find jurisdiction for causes of action arising from past
activities in the forum state when the corporation no longer did business there. Washing-
ton ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
56. 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917) ("[W]hen a power actually is conferred by a document,
the party executing it takes the risk of the interpretation that may be put upon it by the
courts. The execution was the defendant's voluntary act."). The insurance company ap-
pointed an agent in language that was held to authorize acceptance of service.
57. Smolik v. Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (L. Hand,
J.) ("The court, in the interests of justice, imputes results to the voluntary act of doing
business within the foreign state, quite independently of any intent.") (cited with ap-
proval in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917)).
58. 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919) ("[T]he consent that is said to be implied in such [cor-
poration] cases is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States
could exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obliga-
tion as a condition to letting them in.").
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action. Ultimately, the general rule emerged that a state could
assert jurisdiction over corporate (and noncorporate) defendants
participating in activities subject to state regulatory interests. 9
Occasionally, the courts still employed the language of consent."
3. The Presence Cases
Prior to the development of a flexible theory based on
states' interests in regulation, the evolution of implied consent
based upon a corporation's doing business in the forum state
reached major obstacles when a corporation expressly refused to
consent to personal jurisdiction or when the court reasoned that
a state could not exclude a corporation engaged solely in inter-
state commerce. The Supreme Court overcame these difficulties
in International Harvester v. Kentucky6l through the develop-
ment of the principle that a corporation is actually present
wherever it engages in business. The Court placed no signifi-
cance on International Harvester's revocation of the agency of
appointment filed with the forum state after it previously had
engaged in business within the state.62 The new test required the
foreign corporation to carry on a continuous course of business
within the state at the time of service; a single transaction would
not invoke jurisdiction. 3 In the succeeding years numerous cases
59. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
60. Id. at 627 (discussing "implied consent to be sued").
61. 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Under this case, a state may not exclude a business wishing
to transact interstate business, but the state may impose conditions upon admission. A
state may not forbid a foreign corporation from engaging in interstate commerce in the
state under the Constitution and the laws of the United States; however, a foreign corpo-
ration doing business within the state subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the state as to
causes of action arising out of that business.
62. The corporation expressed aversion to consent to suit by instructing its agents in
the following manner:
The company's transactions hereafter with the people of Kentucky must be on
a strictly interstate commerce basis. . . . Anything that is done that placed the
company.. . as having done business in Kentucky will not only make the man
: . * liable to a fine. . . but it will make the company liable for doing business
in the state without complying with the requirements of the laws of the state.
Id. at 584-85.
63. Id. at 589. Presence of the foreign corporation thus required a higher standard
of doing business than that of mere presence. "A foreign corporation is amenable to
process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing busi-
ness within the state in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that
it is present there." Philadelphia & R. R.R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). In
15
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provided ample opportunity for the Supreme Court to apply the
idea of presence. The Court's inability to develop a precise and
comprehensive definition of presence resulted in a number of
rules of thumb based on the facts of each case. A corporation
without representative agents in a forum state could be found
not present despite doing a large amount of business in the
state. 4 Visits by corporate agents to make business purchases,
even at regular intervals, did not warrant the inference that the
corporation was present within the jurisdiction of the state.
6 5
Under the presence theory, once a corporation left a state, the
corporation could no longer be sued for claims arising directly
out of its business transactions that occurred while the corpora-
tion was in the state."' Even if continuously doing business in
the state, the corporation might avoid jurisdiction on claims un-
related to the in-state business.6 7
McKibbin, a Pennnsylvania railroad sent loaded freight cars shipped by others to New
York, which were returned, but this was not enough to find that the corporation was
doing business. In denying jurisdiction the Supreme Court noted that the railroad com-
pany had no dock, no freight, no passenger ticket office, no agent, and no property in
New York, In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917), the
New York court ruled that the weight of the facts supported state jurisdiction when: (i)
the Pennsylvania corporate defendant had a branch office in New York where a sales
agent supervised eight salesmen; (ii) the company systematically and regularly obtained
orders; and (iii) the firm made shipments from Pennsylvania to New York, although all
New York sales were subject to Philadelphia confirmation. "We are to say, not whether
the business is such that the corporation may be prevented from being here, but whether
its business is such that it is here. . . . [I1f it is here, . . . not occasionally or casually,
but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then, . it is within the jurisdic-
tion of our courts." Id. at 267, 115 N.E. at 917.
64. The Court affirmed the lack of jurisdiction when in Bank of Am. v. Whitney
Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923), the Whitney Bank had varied, important, and
extensive New York business transactions, but no New York place of business. Corre-
spondent banks, comparable to factors acting for an absent principal, transacted
Whitney's regular New York business. Id. at 172-73.
65. In Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), although the
president of a corporate defendant received service while on a regular purchasing trip in
New York for his Oklahoma store, the Court affirmed the motion to quash because the
retailer never applied for a license to do business in New York, never authorized suit
against it, and owned no New York property.
66. "[Ilt seems impossible to impute the idea of locality to a corporation except by
virtue of those acts which realize its purposes. . . . If we are to attribute locality to it at
all, it must be equally present wherever any part of its work goes on, as much in the little
as in the great." Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
67. In Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equip. Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), decided under the
interstate commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, a Minnesota statute compelled
every foreign interstate carrier to submit to suit as a condition of maintaining a soliciting
16
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The following activities did not suffice to establish presence:
sending railroad cars shipped by others;"6 having numerous
transactions through a large number of correspondent banks
without setting up an office; 9 only purchasing supplies, even if
on a regular basis;70 and leasing an office for infrequent use and
negotiating within the forum state the purchase of an indepen-
dent, nonoperating subsidiary.7'
The following situations did suffice to establish a corpora-
tion's presence: solicitating business and shipping equipment;
7 2
maintaining a corporate office and having regular meetings;
73
maintaining an office and agents with apparent negotiating au-
thority;74 and making systematic and regular orders and
shipments.75
4. Noncorporate Consent
The initial cases sustaining in personam jurisdiction over in-
dividual nonresidents relied on state statutes imposing jurisdic-
tional requirements upon a nonresident automobile owner for
the operation of the automobile within the forum state. The pre-
cursor to these cases was Kane v. New Jersey,6 in which a New
York resident was arrested in New Jersey when he failed to reg-
ister his vehicle as required by New Jersey law. Although it ac-
knowledged that the state could not exclude the individual from
entering the state, the Supreme Court upheld the statute.
agent within the state. Jurisdiction was not limited to suits arising out of business trans-
acted within the forum state and was not limited to causes of action arising in the forum
state. The plaintiff corporation was not and had never been a resident of the state. Be-
cause the statute was too broad, the judgment was void. 262 U.S. at 317.
68. Philadelphia & R. R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
69. Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923).
70. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
71. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
72. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
73. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68 (1913).
74. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1912).
75. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
76. 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
77. The New Jersey statute required that an entering nonresident motorist stop at
the state border and obtain permission to enter. Justice Brandeis noted that the New
Jersey nonresident motorist statute placed nonresidents on an equal footing with resi-
dent owners. Id. at 168.
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The Massachusetts law in Palowski v. Hess 8 attempted to
provide a remedy for injuries caused by nonresident motorists
driving in the state. The statute allowed nonresident drivers to
enter the state provided that the drivers subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of the state's courts. The motorists' use of state
highways was the conduct on which the state could place respon-
sibility on nonresident defendants."9
The Supreme Court later clarified that a state's jurisdiction
over a motor vehicle's owner did not rest on consent, but rather
on the state's interest in regulating to protect against the inher-
ent dangers of operating a motor vehicle on the state's
highways.80
5. Relationship to Purposeful Availment
The doctrines of consent and presence bear an antecedent
relationship to purposeful availment. As noted, consent relates
directly to purposeful availment: both are intentional activities
that indicate voluntary submission to the power of the sover-
eign, and thus permit the exercise of the sovereign's power.8 1
The relationship between presence and purposeful availment is
less direct. If a court cannot locate a defendant save by the de-
fendant's activities, as in the case of a corporation or other en-
tity that has no physical existence, then the court looks at the
activities to locate the defendant. Purposeful availment is inten-
tional activity in which the defendant itself engages. Therefore,
it is a manifestation of presence.
Of course, by the time of Hanson, both consent and pres-
78. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
79. Id. at 356 ("The measure. . . operates to require a nonresident to answer for his
conduct .... [T]he implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or
collisions on a highway in which the non-resident may be involved.").
80. The Court stated:
[T]here has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason why a non-
resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-resident has
"impliedly" consented to be sued there. In point of fact, however, jurisdiction
in these cases does not rest on consent at all. The defendant may protest to
high heaven his unwillingness to be sued and it avails him not. The liability
rests on the inroad which the automobile has made on the decision of Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [(1877)], as it has on so many aspects of our social
scene.
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) (citation omitted).
81. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
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ence were viewed as fictions.8 2 A state had no clear basis to keep
a foreign corporation or motorist from doing the conduct upon
which the demand for consent to jurisdiction was conditioned;
therefore, consent covered far less than what the courts felt was
appropriate jurisdiction. On the other hand, the presence justifi-
cation covered almost every case and had to be restricted in
ways that seemed irrational and unjustified by the theoretical
basis of the presence doctrine. The difficulties with these doc-
trines were part of the pressure that made the Court in Interna-
tional Shoe downplay the entire idea of sovereignty in favor of
concepts tied more closely to fairness.8s When sovereignty made
its rebound in Hanson, however, it was to be expected that some
of the ideas that had grown up around sovereignty would return
too. They did, in the form of purposeful availment.
C. Purposeful Availment After Hanson
1. The Supreme Court
Chronologically, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szuk-
hent84 followed Hanson. The case is sometimes not even thought
of as a territorial jurisdiction case because the Court treated as
established the proposition that, if a contracting party agrees to
a forum selection clause, the designated forum has jurisdiction
over the party. Although four dissenting justices wished to scru-
tinize the waiver,8 5 the Court ignored questions of voluntariness.
The Court merely decided that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d)(1) permitted service on defendant's agent, who was a nomi-
nee of the plaintiff and who had been appointed in the form
contract that the plaintiff drafted.86 Because the propriety of the
forum depended on jurisdiction by consent (the forum selection
clause in the contract), National Equipment Rental provided an
opportunity to clarify the relationship between purposeful avail-
ment as a form of constructive consent and the consent doctrine
82. See supra note 58 and 80 and accompanying text.
83. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of the
State Courts, 66 Micu. L. REV. 227, 227-30 (1967).
84. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
85. Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting), 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 313. Apparently, she was the wife of one of the plaintiff's officers. Id. at
319 (Black, J., dissenting).
1988]
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in general. The opportunity passed.87
Shaffer v. Heitner" extended the minimum contacts test to
in rem jurisdiction. Equally notable is the Court's application of
the Hanson v. DenckIa purposeful availment requirement.8 9 The
Shaffer Court, however, did make some changes in the require-
ment's surroundings. The Court did not mention state sover-
eignty. Instead, the Court began its application of the minimum
contacts test by discussing Delaware's interest in its corporate
directors' conduct, an interest the Court dismissed because Del-
aware had no statute asserting it."0 The Court followed this dis-
cussion by noting that even if the state had an important inter-
est, the forum still had to be "fair.""' It then recited the
purposeful availment requirement, separating the interests that
would support application of the forum's law to the dispute from
the requirements for jurisdiction. 2 Finally, the Court rejected
the idea that the defendants' acceptance of the directorships
constituted purposeful availment. In doing so, the Court
emended the purposeful availment standard by adding an idea
of foreseeability: the purposeful availment requirement was not
met because the directors had no reason to expect that the ac-
ceptance of the directorships, their sole purposeful conduct re-
lated to Delaware, would constitute consent to jurisdiction.9"
87. In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court went beyond
National Equip. Rental and directly upheld a forum selection clause when Rule 4(d)(1)
was not at issue. The Court thus had an even more direct opportunity to discuss the
theoretical basis of jurisdiction by consent. It again treated the jurisdictional theory as a
given, however, and focused instead only on the voluntariness of the contractual under-
taking, the supposed benefits to United States foreign trade if international contracts are
enforced, and the absence of a showing of impossibility of defending in the forum.
88. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The case was a shareholder's derivative suit filed in Dela-
ware against, among others, the directors of a Delaware corporation. Plaintiff initiated
the action by sequestering the stock that the directors held, the situs of which, according
to Delaware law, was Delaware. Although the plaintiff contended that the sequestration
established quasi in rem jurisdiction without any need for minimum contacts, the Court
held that the minimum contacts test had to be satisfied in all exercises of jurisdiction,
including in rem proceedings.
89. Id. at 215-16.
90. Id. at 214-15.
91. Id. at 215.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 216. In his concurrence Justice Stevens elaborated on this idea. He wrote
that foreseeability of suit in the jurisdiction constituted "fair warning" for an individual
contemplating activities in a given state. If this warning is missing, it is a violation of the
due process clause's requirement that there be notice before a binding judgment is en-
[Vol. 39
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Like Shaffer, Kulko v. California Superior Court94 did not
mention state sovereignty, but still made the Hanson purposeful
availment inquiry. In this action for child support, the Court re-
jected California's attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a New
York father when the mother moved to California after living
with the family in New York for eleven years. The father sent
his daughter, at her request, to California to live with her
mother during the school year. The Court found this one contact
with California insufficient to support jurisdiction. Applying the
purposeful availment requirement, the Court reasoned that the
father did not purposefully derive any benefit from activities re-
lating to the State of California. The father simply reduced his
household expenses related to his daughter.95 In the remainder
of the opinion, the Court discussed and rejected considerations
of reasonability, distinguishing the case from one in which phys-
ical injury is caused in the forum state;96 fairness, distinguishing
the case from one in which the parent might have done an act
that would create a reasonable anticipation of vulnerability to
jurisdiction, such as continuously living in the forum state
before separation;97 and the state's interest, distinguishing the
case from one in which a particularized state statute might as-
sert an interest and no other possible remedy might exist for the
parents within its jurisdiction. 8
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson" further devel-
oped the foreseeability theme in finding no jurisdiction for a
products liability action against an out-of-state car distributor
and dealer whose sales activities did not extend to the forum
state. Applying ideas of sovereignty and federalism, the Court
emphasized that an out-of-state defendant would not be subject
to jurisdiction unless it had minimum contacts with the fo-
rum.' 0 The Court said that the foreseeability relevant to
tered. Id. at 217-18.
94. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
95. Id. at 94-96.
96. Id. at 96-98.
97. Id. at 97-98.
98. Id. at 98-100. The Court relied on California's and New York's adoption of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 1-43, 9B U.L.A.
381 (1987).
99. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The facts of the case are further discussed infra notes 174
& 198-207 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 293-94.
19881
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whether the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of the forum state was the foreseeability of being haled
into the forum state's courts.101 The foreseeable activity of cus-
tomers driving their cars into out-of-state forums, in the Court's
view, was mere "unilateral activity" of a person other than the
defendant, which did not amount to purposeful availment under
Hanson.0 12
In Rush v. Savchuk 0 3 the Court, without elaborating on the
purposeful availment requirement, applied it to forbid jurisdic-
tion in Minnesota over a resident of Indiana in an automobile
accident negligence action. Jurisdiction was based on the attach-
ment of a national insurance company's obligation to indemnify
the Indiana resident. The accident took place in Indiana. Al-
though the insurer had ample contacts with Minnesota, the
Court insisted that the purposeful availment test be applied to
the named defendant, not the entity that the plaintiff main-
tained had its real interests at stake.104 In applying the pur-
poseful availment requirement to the named defendant, the
Court noted that the defendant would not have reasonably ex-
pected to be subjecting himself to an out-of-state suit by buying
insurance and driving in Indiana. Thus, the defendant had not
engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum state.0 5
To the extent that the Court provided any rationale for the pur-
poseful availment requirement, it stated that purposeful activity
renders the exercise of jurisdiction "fair, just or reasonable.' 0 6
The Court made no mention of sovereignty or federalism.
In 1984 the Court applied the purposeful availment require-
ment in three cases. Two were libel cases. Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.10 7 established that, when purposefully created
minimum contacts exist in the form of magazine sales that range
101. Id. at 297. This position would, of course, be circular if the anticipation of be-
ing haled into court depended simply on the rule being adopted in the case. But the
Court, in line with earlier articulations of foreseeability ideas, seemed to want to incor-
porate traditional jurisdictional tests (presumably from pre-minimum contacts days) as
the basis of the expectations, thus giving the idea some content, whatever the merit of
the content might be, See infra text accompanying notes 269-71.
102. 444 U.S. at 298.
103. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
104. Id. at 330-31.
105. Id. at 329.
106. Id.
107. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
[Vol. 39
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from 10,000 to 15,000 copies per month, jurisdiction exists even
though damages could be calculated based on injury throughout
the nation and the forum had an unusually long statute of limi-
tations. The Court found the forum's interest to be substan-
tial10 8 and held that the choice of law issue regarding the statute
of limitations would not affect the jurisdiction of the court.109
The Court found the absence of plaintiff's contacts with the fo-
rum insignificant. 1 0 The Court's application of the purposeful
availment requirement was just one paragraph in length and
held that a magazine publisher's continuous and deliberate ex-
ploitation of a market gives rise to a reasonable anticipation of
being haled into court on a libel action over the magazine's con-
tents.' The Court also stated that the scope of the action was
not unfair because the magazine publisher had to be charged
with knowledge of the rule that one forum in a libel action may
award damages for injury nationwide." 2
Calder v. Jones"3 established that libel defendants have no
greater protection from long arm jurisdiction than other defend-
ants. In the absence of enhanced protection, the defendant re-
porter and editor were subject to jurisdiction, for they knew
their article would reach the forum state, where it would have its
most devastating impact. The publication had its largest circula-
tion in that state, and the plaintiff both resided and based her
career there." 4 Thus, the reporter and editor had to have antici-
pated being haled into the forum state's courts to answer a suit
over the article's contents." 5 No further explanation of the pur-
poseful availment requirement or the requirement's rationale
were given in the opinion.
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall 6 the
Court held that a Colombian transportation company's accept-
ance of checks drawn on a Texas bank was not sufficient pur-
poseful availment to justify jurisdiction in Texas for an action to
108. Id. at 776-78.
109. Id. at 778-79.
110. Id. at 779.
111. Id. at 781.
112. Id.
113. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
114. Id. at 785, 788-89.
115. Id. at 790.
116. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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recover for the death of Americans in a helicopter accident in
Peru. The Court rejected these actions as "unilateral activity of
another party," insufficient under Hanson and Kulko to support
jurisdiction.1 17 Apparently employing the same standard, the
Court also found that trips to Texas to make purchases and
train pilots on purchased aircraft were insufficient to support
jurisdiction.11 8
The next case to apply the purposeful availment require-
ment,"' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,1=0 upheld jurisdiction
in Florida over a Michigan franchisee when the franchiser, a
Florida resident, sued to enforce the franchise agreement. Using
a rationale that relied on fairness concepts, 2' the Court applied
the purposeful availment requirement and held that the require-
ment was satisfied when the defendant made a long-term
franchise agreement with a Florida corporation knowing that he
would derive benefits from a "structured 20-year relationship
that envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with [the
plaintiff] in Florida."' 22 The Court also found that the clause in
117. Id. at 416-17.
118. Id. at 417-18. See generally infra note 234 (further description of the
Helicopteros Nacionales' reasoning regarding the purchases in the forum state).
119. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), with language that
adverted solely to fairness of litigation burdens, the Court sustained the jurisdiction of a
Kansas court over absent, out-of-state plaintiff class members in an action to recover for
withheld mineral rights lease royalties. The Court permitted the defendant to challenge
jurisdiction, just as it had permitted the Florida defendants to challenge jurisdiction over
the Delaware trustees in Hanson v. Denckla. Id. at 805-06. The Court accepted the idea
that the absent plaintiffs had the same due process rights as defendants, but noted that
the burdens on class members were all but nonexistent, while the burdens on an out-of-
state defendant could be substantial. Id. at 808-09. The Court also stressed due process
protections afforded the class members such as notice, the right to opt out of the action,
and court approval of the representative party. Id. at 809-11. Although the Court sus-
tained the Kansas court's jurisdiction over the case, it rejected the application of forum
state law. Id. at 816-23. The case is significant for its total reliance on fairness considera-
tions, including its statement that the minimum contacts test protects defendants from
"the travail of defending in a distant forum, unless the defendant's contacts with the
forum make it just to force him to defend there." Id. at 807. It is equally significant for
its assimilation of territorial jurisdiction into ordinary procedural due process, with the
implication that other procedural protections may compensate for weaker territorial ju-
risdiction restrictions. Id. at 811-12. See infra text accompanying notes 251-57. The
Court, however, did not discuss or apply the purposeful availment test beyond the lan-
guage just quoted; it found no need even to apply minimum contacts reasoning. Id. at
806-07.
120. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
121. Id. at 471-76.
122. Id. at 480.
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the contract providing for application of Florida law should have
warned the defendant of the likelihood of litigation in Florida
and made defendant's conduct more deliberate.
123
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court124 is the
Court's latest territorial jurisdiction case. All the Justices but
Justice Scalia agreed that considerations other than purposeful
availment required the rejection of California's assertion of ju-
risdiction. Other factors considered included: the forum state's
interest, the defendant's burden, and the plaintiff's interest in
having the forum adjudicate the case. With respect to the pur-
poseful availment requirement, however, the Court split. The
four-justice plurality found the purposeful availment require-
ment was not met when a Japanese manufacturer of motorcycle
tire valve assemblies sold the valves to a Taiwanese tire manu-
facturer, with the knowledge that some tire value assemblies
would ultimately be used California. Justice O'Connor stated:
"The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, with-
out more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State.' 2 She distinguished the case from in-
stances in which a hypothetical defendant might design a prod-
uct for a market in the forum, advertise in the forum, create
channels to provide advice to customers in the forum, or market
the product through a sales agent in the forum. 26 She concluded
that mere knowledge that the product will eventually be used in
the forum state does not suffice. 127
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that plac-
ing a product in the stream of commerce with the knowledge
that it will be swept into the forum is sufficient to satisfy the
123. The Court stated:
Nothing in our cases, however, suggests that a choice-of-law provision should
be ignored in considering whether a defendant has "purposefully invoked the
benefits and protections of a State's laws" for jurisdictional purposes. Although
such a provision standing alone would be insufficient to confer jurisdiction, we
believe that, when combined with the 20-year interdependent relationship
Rudzewicz established with [plaintiff's] Miami headquarters, it reinforced his
deliberate affiliation with the forum State and the reasonable foreseeability of
possible litigation there.
Id. at 482.
124. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
125. Id. at 1033.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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purposeful availment requirement. 128 No other conduct ought to
be necessary. 1 2 He stated that a "regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale" pro-
vides adequate notice of the possibility of a lawsuit in the state
in which the final product is marketed. °30 Thus, the foreseeabil-
ity component of purposeful availment was met. Justice Bren-
nan also stressed that the manufacturer received a significant fi-
nancial benefit by placing the product in the stream of
commerce, which allowed the product to reach markets in dis-
tant places. In part the profits accrue from the state's laws regu-
lating and facilitating commerce. 3 1 Justice Stevens joined
neither the plurality nor the Brennan expositions of purposeful
availment. Stevens said in concurrence that the plurality opinion
was wrong in drawing "an unwavering line . . . between 'mere
awareness' that a component will find its way into the forum
State and 'purposeful availment' of the forum's market."' 2 Jus-
tice Stevens did not reach a definite conclusion because he be-
lieved that, since the Court agreed jurisdiction was inappropri-
ate for other reasons, it should not adjudicate the purposeful
availment issue.133 Stevens, said, however, that, based on the
volume, value, and hazardous character of the products Asahi
sold, he "would be inclined to conclude" that Asahi's conduct
constituted purposeful availment.'3 4
Thus, a majority of the Court135 holds the opinion that plac-
ing products in the stream of commerce, without more, may sat-
isfy the purposeful availment requirement. Apart from stream of
commerce cases, it is difficult to see whether Asahi changed the
purposeful availment doctrine significantly. 3 6 If the activity in
128. Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Justice Powell, who resigned at the end of the 1986-87 Term, was in the
minority.
136. Even with respect to stream of commerce cases, the position of the majority of
the Court was not significantly different from prior Supreme Court views. In dicta,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980), endorsed Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961),
which held that jurisdiction existed for a products liability cause of action under facts
similar to those in Asahi. The Court declared that "[t]he forum State does not exceed its
840 [Vol. 39
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the forum state is conducted by others who are not the defend-
ant's agents and the benefits to the defendant are small, uncer-
tain, or remote, it appears that the requirement may not be met
even though the defendant both foresees being haled into Court
and actually profits from the activity. Applying "traditional no-
tions" of jurisdiction such as state sovereignty and the "pres-
ence" concept, Asahi would have likely come out the same
way. 1
37
2. The Lower Courts
The lower courts are probably best approached on a topical
rather than a chronological basis. The differing formulations of
purposeful availment in the Supreme Court's opinions (espe-
cially in light of the nineteen-year gap from Hanson to Shaffer)
have had little significance on the outcome of lower court cases
applying the purposeful availment requirement.
As the Court stated in Hanson, the decision whether pur-
poseful availment is present must be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis.' As a result, federal and state courts have been forced to
treat each jurisdictional dispute individually to determine
whether a party has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State."'39 Although
this approach invites widespread disparity in outcome, the re-
sulting decisions have been surprisingly uniform when applied to
similarly situated parties.
Generally, courts have been more reluctant to assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction over individual defendants than corporate
defendants. 40 Many of the cases that have found jurisdiction
lacking would have had opposite results if a corporation had
been challenging the authority of the court.'4 Thus, the require-
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 444 U.S. at 297-98.
137. See Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923) (jurisdic-
tion not permitted when defendant had extensive business in the forum, but no office or
employees).
138. 357 U.S. at 253.
139. Id.
140. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
141. For example, telephone conversations are usually not evidence of purposeful
availment allowed with respect to individuals. Telephone communications, however, are
1988]
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ments or standards for purposeful availment have become more
stringent with respect to individuals.14 s
An example of the disparate standards can be found in
viewing results flowing from various actual physical contacts
with forum states. Jurisdiction has been established over indi-
viduals based on prior vacations, 143 prior residence within the
forum state, and prior use of a state's educational or legal insti-
tutions. 44 The opposite approach, however, has also been taken.
Courts have ruled that the prior domicile of a party cannot serve
as evidence of personal availment unless the prior domicile re-
lated to the lawsuit in question.14 5
Prior domicile or contact has been raised often in marital
disputes. The courts, however, have been virtually uniform in
rejecting such jurisdiction.1 .4 In most of these instances, the
party seeking to invoke the court's power has come to the forum
state on the strength of his or her own presence in the forum.
The lower courts have followed Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 1 4 and have rejected jurisdiction over the foreign state
spouse for purposes of alimony or child support orders.
148
readily accepted as evidence of commercial purposeful availment. See infra notes 153-54
and accompanying text. In either case communication by mail or by telephone has come
to play an increasingly significant role in determining the existence of jurisdiction. See
Computac, Inc. v. Dixie News Co., 124 N.H. 350, 354, 469 A.2d 1345, 1347 (1983).
142. Compare Ealing Corp. v. Harrods, Ltd., 790 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1986) (telephone
communication along with other acts sufficient to create purposeful availment) with Fox
v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (telephone call insufficient basis for jurisdiction).
143, See Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1892 (1987) (prior vacation in forum supporting exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction).
144. See Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) (jurisdiction supported because
defendant sought assistance of state authorities in enforcing a court order). But see Bur-
stein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction not supported by
residents of forum joining organization).
145. See, e.g., Carrillo v. Carrillo, 523 A.2d 439 (R.I. 1987) (no jurisdiction in former
state of domicile; first home state of married couple not permitted to exercise jurisdic-
tion over divorce).
146. E.g., Marbury v. Marbury, 256 Ga. 651, 352 S.E.2d 564 (1987) (no jurisdiction
when defendant had not lived in forum for past 14 years); Crouch v. Crouch, 641 S.W.2d
86 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (brief stay in forum while married not sufficient to support
jurisdiction). But see Brislavm v. Brislawn, 443 So. 2d 32 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984) (jurisdiction supported by 10-day stay in forum for marriage).
147. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
148. See, e.g., Morton v. United States, 708 F.2d 680 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (wife and chil-
dren moving to forum not supportive of jurisdiction over father), rev'd on other grounds,
467 U.S. 822 (1984).
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The standards for individuals also differ when communica-
tion with a forum is asserted as the basis for jurisdiction. For
example, postal communications with parties located within the
forum state generally have been found to be insufficient to es-
tablish jurisdiction.149 Likewise, telephone calls have not been
enough to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over an individual
absent other evidence of contact with the forum.'10
When applied to commercial interests, however, the use of
communication with a forum state as a basis for jurisdiction has
received more favorable attention. Correspondence between
commercial parties has constituted purposeful availment and,
therefore, served as a basis for jurisdiction. 15 1 In addition, the
use of advertising has gained acceptance as evidence of pur-
poseful availment. When directed at residents of the forum
state, advertising is an attempt to solicit business there. Thus,
the advertiser has availed itself of the privileges of the forum
and is subject to jurisdiction.1
52
Telephone and telex communications have been found suffi-
cient to warrant jurisdiction, especially when evidence shows an
intent to create a continuing relationship with the forum
state.153 Communication that is evidence of intent to maintain a
149. See, e.g., Beacon Enter. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (cease and
desist letter not basis for jurisdiction); see also Altshuler Genealogical Service v. Farris,
128 N.H. 98, 508 A.2d 1091 (1986) (signing and returning a letter of solicitation not
purposeful availment); Morrill v. Tong, 390 Mass. 120, 453 N.E.2d 1221 (1983) (letter to
attorney not purposeful availment).
150. Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (telephone call alone insufficient to
support jurisdiction); Valley Wide Health Servs., Inc. v. Graham, 738 P.2d 1316 (N.M.
1987) (returning a telephone call to a New Mexico number not purposeful availment).
151. See Computac, Inc. v. Dixie News Co., 124 N.H. 350, 469 A.2d 1345 (1983)
(correspondence between parties sufficient for purposeful availment). But see Cus-
tomwood Mfg., v. Downey Constr. Co., 102 N.M. 56, 691 P.2d 57 (1984) (mailing of
purchase order not purposeful availment).
152. See Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc., 745 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1984) (heavy adver-
tisement in Louisiana media constituted purposeful availment); see also Hall's Special-
ties, Inc. v. Schupbach, 758 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1985) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (advertise-
ment and solicitation in forum constituted purposeful availment); Meyers v. Hamilton
Corp., 143 Ariz. 249, 693 P.2d 904 (1984) (advertising and sale of tickets within forum
supportive of jurisdiction). But see Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40,
43 (6th Cir. 1988) (no purposeful availment despite some advertising).
153. See Computac, 124 N.H. 350, 469 A.2d 1345 (continuing communication sup-
portive of jurisdiction); cf. Brown v. Flower's Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982)
(long-distance call that constituted intentional tort supportive of jurisdiction). But see
Institutional Food Mktg. Ass'n v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.
1984) (telephone and mail contacts alone were insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
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relationship has allowed the forum state to preside over any dis-
pute between the parties.154
Many courts have required evidence of an ongoing relation-
ship to establish purposeful availment. Even though the defend-
ant might have purposeful contacts with the forum, courts have
declined to assert jurisdiction because of the absence of intent to
create an ongoing relationship.
155
The use of agents by corporate and business interests has
further complicated the application of the purposeful availment
requirement. Agents who have contact with a forum and are
under substantial corporate direction and control, even though
technically independent workers, have served as evidence of pur-
poseful availment, and their activities have been grounds for ju-
risdiction. 5 " The presence of agents under little or no control by
the corporate defendant, however, has not sustained
jurisdiction.
1 57
Corporate and commercial parties have become subject to
jurisdiction based on delivery provisions in contracts. This type
of connection with a forum, however, has not always been suffi-
cient to support jurisdiction. While federal courts have allowed
location of delivery sites in the forum state to constitute pur-
poseful availment,'58 New Hampshire, for example, has rejected
that position and required other evidence to support the exercise
of jurisdiction.159
154. 124 N.H. 350, 469 A.2d 1345. The court in Computac did not focus on the
purposeful availment analysis. Instead, it noted the long-term relationship between the
parties and upheld jurisdiction accordingly. Id. at 353-54, 467 A.2d at 1347.
155. E.g., Sea Lift, Inc. v. Refinadora Costarricense de Petroleo, S.A., 792 F.2d 989
(11th Cir. 1986).
156. See Mason v. F. Lli Luigi & Franco Dal Maschio, 832 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir.
1988) (activities of employee and export managing firm supportive of jurisdiction);
Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1985) (establish-
ment of purposeful availment by agent who solicited students within the forum state);
Sales Serv., Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (America) Corp., 719 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1983) (agent
soliciting business in the forum, constituted purposeful availment of the forum's bene-
fits); Peanut Corp. of Am. v. Hollywood Brands, Inc., 696 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1982) (solic-
iting business through agents constituted purposeful availment). But see Dalmau Rodri-
quez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (single visit by sales
representative not purposeful availment).
157. Smith v. Jenkins, 452 A.2d 333 (D.C. 1982) (no purposeful availment if princi-
pal has no control over agent).
158. See Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir.
1985) (delivery of material in the forum state a factor supporting personal jurisdiction).
159. Weld Power Indus. v. C.S.I. Technologies, Inc., 124 N.H. 121, 467 A.2d 568
844 [Vol. 39
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II. THE THEORETICAL BASES OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
A. State Sovereignty
The doctrines of constructive consent and presence would
have been unnecessary had it not been for the fundamental doc-
trine of sovereignty-based limits on the exercise of jurisdiction,
and purposeful availment would not have been necessary if all
restrictions on state jurisdiction were abolished. As noted above,
Hanson v. Denckla revived the sovereignty theory of the limits
on state jurisdiction'"0 and at the same time originated the pur-
(1983) (when the sole contact with forum was the site for the transfer of contract goods,
no purposeful availment occurred). Not only has the delivery site of a movable object
been used to support jurisdiction, but some courts have also used the transportation of
an object through a forum to support the exercise of jurisdiction. See Myers v. John
Deere, Ltd., 683 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1982) (material being shipped through forum state
supportive of personal jurisdiction). Courts have assimilated this into the much larger
stream of commerce theory behind the exercise of personal jurisdiction. By allowing
goods to be marketed, sold, or transported with the knowledge that they will come into
contact with the forum, commercial parties have availed themselves of the benefits of the
forum's laws. Accordingly, in personam jurisdiction can be exercised over that party. See
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 804 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1986) (selling helicop-
ter parts destined for forum state supportive of jurisdiction); see also Raffaele v. Compa-
gnie Generale Maritime, S.A., 707 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1983) (shipping goods knowing they
were going to forum state supportive of personal jurisdiction); Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982) (trading company on notice that product would come into
contact with forum state); cf. State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 294 Or.
381, 657 P.2d 211 (1982) (selling parts or machinery that go to forum state supportive of
jurisdiction).
160. Without mentioning sovereignty, inherent limits on state territorial power, or
other such terms, the Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957),
upheld California's jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurance company that did no busi-
ness in the state save re-issuing one contract and accepting premiums on it. The Court,
however, did discuss the general minimum contacts test, the forum state's interest, and
the risk of serious inconvenience to the defendant. Id. at 222-24. Vanderbilt v. Vander-
bilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 n.6 (1957), did cite Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in resolv-
ing a conflict between a Nevada divorce decree and a New York judgment for separation
and alimony. In analyzing the matter as one touching the full faith and credit clause,
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, however, the Court relied on the fact that the Nevada courts did
not even arguably have any jurisdiction over the spouse who obtained the New York
judgment, while the New York court apparently had jurisdiction over the spouse who
sued in Nevada. 354 U.S. at 418-19. Thus, neither sovereignty nor fairness had to be
addressed in any detail. The Court in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, 444-45 (1952), responded to defendant's arguments, which sounded in territorial
sovereignty, with an assertion that the exercise of jurisdiction was fair, and without any
discussion of sovereignty concepts. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950), contained no explicit discussion of sovereignty ideas,
and drew a comparison between International Shoe's jurisdictional considerations and
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poseful availment requirement. 161
The audacity with which the Court did the former is re-
markable. Without any explanation of why it had not mentioned
state territorial sovereignty in any of the six major personal ju-
risdiction cases"6 2 since International Shoe, the Court simply as-
serted that restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts "are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power
of the respective states.' 6 3 Thus, territorial restrictions operate
to forbid the assertion of jurisdiction despite the absence of in-
convenience6 or the presence within the forum of the case's
"center of gravity" (where the parties with concrete interests are
located, or where litigation is the most convenient for all). 165 The
only cases that the Court cited in support of these territorial re-
strictions were International Shoe and Vanderbilt v. Vander-
bilt. '6 Vanderbilt addressed a conflict between the decrees of
two divorce courts, one or the other of which had no jurisdiction
over the spouse it was attempting to bind. 6 7 The Court resolved
the issue under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion 6 8 without mentioning state sovereignty. International Shoe
reread old precedents that relied on sovereignty along the lines
of the minimum contacts test without saying whether the test
the considerations relevant to forum non conveniens doctrine, a topic to which sover-
eignty is irrelevant and convenience paramount. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), mentioned neither territorial sovereignty nor convenience
in upholding a statutory procedure that foreclosed the monetary claims of out-of-state
beneficiaries of a common trust fund. The Court, without citation of authority, relied
simply on the fact that the practice of periodically closing trusts was "rooted in custom."
Id. at 313. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953), a dispute over
the application of the federal venue statute, included extensive dicta concerning the fic-
tive nature of motorist consent statutes, but did not once refer to state sovereignty. It
may be of significance that Justice Black, who dissented in Hanson v. Denckla, was the
author of Vanderbilt, McGee, and Travelers Health Ass'n.
161. See supra text accompanying note 14.
162. See supra note 160.
163. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 254.
166. 354 U.S. 416 (1957). The Court did take up McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), but only to distinguish it. The Court mentioned Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Henry L. Do-
herty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); and Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927);
but only to aid in distinguishing McGee. 357 U.S. at 252-53.
167. 354 U.S. at 419.
168. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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manifested the sovereignty idea, the idea of fairness apart from
sovereignty, or both.' 69 In Hanson the discussion of purposeful
availment followed the discussion of sovereignty by just two
pages.1 0 Nothing in the opinion, however, related the ideas of
sovereignty and purposeful availment to each other. Nothing
spelled out that the basis of the purposeful availment require-
ment is the concept of state sovereignty.
Ideas of state territorial sovereignty furnish a theoretical
basis for the purposeful availment requirement in the same
manner in which they furnished a basis for constructive consent.
Taking these sovereignty ideas in their classic form, in Pennoyer
v. Neff, they posit that every state has exclusive jurisdiction over
persons and property within its boundaries, and no state may
exercise jurisdiction over persons and property outside its
boundaries.' Either purposeful availment of the benefits and
protections of the laws of the state is the knowing waiver of the
defense that the state lacks jurisdiction, or it is the conduct of a
corporation or other intangible being that manifests the pres-
ence of the entity within the borders of the state.
Purposeful availment acts as a waiver of an objection to ju-
risdiction exercised outside the borders of the state. Like other
waivers of constitutional objections to adverse state action,
169. 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945). The Court's reliance on "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" embodies the fairness-sovereignty ambiguity. The language
is a quotation from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), which was premised on
sovereignty reasoning, but it obviously speaks of subjective fairness to the parties. The
Court reinforced the fairness idea with its statement that an "estimate of the inconve-
niences" is relevant, even though that phrase also is taken from a case decided against a
background of sovereignty ideas, Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930). The Court's treatment of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) as a histor-
ical artifact also highlighted the importance of fairness apart from territorial sovereignty.
326 U.S. at 316. Supporting the territorial sovereignty idea, however, is the Court's re-
fusal to overrule any of the earlier opinions, even Pennoyer, and the possible inclusion
within "traditional notions" of those expectations built up from years of strict territorial
sovereignty reasoning. See Kurland, supra note 27, at 590 (1958). See generally Green-
stein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 855, 866 (1987) ("International Shoe presents the state sovereignty theme
through the very concept of 'minimum contacts.' "); Redish, Due Process, Federalism,
and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 1117-18
(1981) (arguing that International Shoe left the sovereignty framework intact).
170. 357 U.S. at 251-53. The two pages contain the Court's efforts at distinguishing
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
171. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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waiver by purposeful availment is knowing172 because it contains
a foreseeability component. From International Shoe's proviso
that exercise of jurisdiction not offend "traditional" notions, 173
to World-Wide's clarification that the relevant expectation for
establishing jurisdiction is the expectation of suit, not of in-
jury,17 4 to Asahi's repetition of World- Wide's expectations lan-
guage, 7 5 the Court has worked hard to eliminate any possibility
that a defendant will be taken by surprise by a state's assertion
of jurisdiction.1 6 Moreover, the waiver is voluntary,177 because it
is based on intentional conduct, rather than unilateral action by
other parties.1
78
Waiver of jurisdictional objections is a well-established basis
for assertion of jurisdiction even under the most rigid sover-
eignty-bound system. Under such a pre-minimum contacts sys-
tem, not only can the defendant explicitly waive an objection, in
which case the action goes on to an enforceable judgment, 79 but
the defendant can also involuntarily waive an objection by fail-
172. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver defined as "intentional
relinquishment ... of a known right").
173. 326 U.S. at 316.
174. 444 U.S. 286, 297-99 (1980). The Court in World-Wide confronted an automo-
bile accident case in which plaintiffs bought a car in New York, then had an accident in
Oklahoma while moving to Arizona. The Court found that the Oklahoma court in which
plaintiffs sued on a products liability theory had no jurisdiction over the local New York
car dealer and the tri-state (New York, New Jersey and Connecticut) distributor. The
Court applied the minimum contacts test, with a strong emphasis on the purposeful
availment standard and the foreseeability of suit in the distant forum. The Court
stressed that the relevant foreseeability was not of injury in the forum, a test that would
be met with any mobile product. Instead, the relevant test was whether "the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court there." Id. at 297. As additional support for its test, the
Court stated that the federal system of government, with the sovereignty of states limit-
ing the sovereignty of sister states, supported territorial jurisdiction restrictions. Id. at
293.
175. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031-32
(1987).
176. The exception to this statement, of course, is "tag" jurisdiction, in which the
defendant is temporarily in the state but otherwise has no contacts with it, and is served
while there. Cf. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant
served in airplane flying over a corner of the state). Many commentators have predicted
that the Court would not now uphold the exercise of such jurisdiction. E.g., Posnak, A
Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the
"Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729 (1981).
177. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464.
178. 107 S. Ct. at 1031, 1033.
179. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
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ing to take an appeal once a special appearance has been entered
to contest jurisdiction. 80 Most significantly, the defendant can
waive by asserting a counterclaim in the action in which jurisdic-
tion is contested. 8' Indeed, the assertion of the counterclaim is
an example of purposeful availment: the defendant is seeking
out and obtaining the benefits and protections of the laws of the
forum state.
Purposeful availment also manifests presence. An intangible
entity can only establish presence by conduct, and the conduct
that constitutes purposeful availment is visible, voluntary, and
benefits the entity. Thus, those cases in which the defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the
forum state's laws might be considered the easy cases for juris-
diction under a presence test.
These two ideas appear to exhaust the usefulness of pur-
poseful availment within a sovereignty framework. To the extent
it relates to waiver, the purposeful availment requirement pro-
vides an exception for what would otherwise be a prohibited as-
sertion of extraterritorial state power. To the extent it relates to
presence, the requirement is a fact that places an entity within
the state's jurisdiction.
B. Fairness
As noted above, purposeful availment has a fairness justifi-
cation for it embodies an idea of reciprocity between the defend-
ant and the forum state.l 2 The defendant has obtained benefits
from the forum and now has to pay by being subject to its juris-
diction. Of course, as Hanson itself shows, the idea does not ap-
ply to every case in which the purposeful availment requirement
operates to deny jurisdiction.i 3 More generally, the reciprocity
idea seems to be a better reason to uphold jurisdiction, as in
International Shoe, than to defeat it, as in Hanson. When a de-
fendant receives benefits from the laws of the state, it seems
natural to expect the defendant to be subject to the legal au-
180. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
181. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). But see Gates Leariet Corp. v. Jensen,
743 F.2d 1325, 1330 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
183. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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thority of the sovereign that provides and enforces the laws."'
The converse proposition, however, is not necessarily true. Re-
quiring a defendant to appear in court in a state from which it
has not received benefits and protections does not seem unfair
as long as the forum is convenient and has just procedures for
adjudicating the case. Moreover, the appearance of fairness is
enhanced if judicial economy and the convenience of other par-
ties are served by adjudicating the case in the forum. Thus, reci-
procity makes sense as a basis to find that jurisdiction exists
over the defendant, but by itself, reciprocity makes no sense as a
reason for denying jurisdiction. In fact, reciprocity may run
counter to intuitive ideas of fairness when it operates to prevent
jurisdiction.
Apart from reciprocity, other fairness rationales might un-
derlie the purposeful availment requirement. As just suggested,
one aspect of fairness is convenience: the closer the forum, the
cheaper and easier it will be to litigate. The probability of an
unfair result increases when the costs of litigation impair the de-
fendant's ability to defend itself. These costs give rise to subjec-
tive feelings of unfairness. Purposeful availment is a proxy mea-
sure, albeit a rough one, for the convenience of litigation. To the
extent that the defendant has engaged in activity in the forum
that is beneficial, voluntary, and of such a character as to trigger
expectations of suit under traditional jurisdictional tests, it is
reasonable to infer that the cost of litigation there will not be
prohibitive, 8 at least compared to the cost in a different forum
that might also have jurisdiction.
Like reciprocity, however, this factor makes more sense as a
basis for granting jurisdiction than for forbidding it. It is an ex-
ample of the converse proposition fallacy to reason that, because
184. Of course, quarrels might arise over what constitutes receiving a benefit. See
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1035 (Brennan,
J., concurring). In a recent article, Professor Brilmayer and her co-authors emphasize the
importance of reciprocity of benefits and duties as a ground for treating domicile as a
basis for general jurisdiction in a sovereignty-oriented system. Brilmayer, Haverkamp,
Logan, Lynch, Neuworth & O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L.
Rev. 721, 732 (1988). But her analysis stresses the right to vote and participate in other
political activities. Id. at 733. The political considerations would appear to be most rele-
vant regarding choice of law, which governs substantive responsibilities rather than terri-
torial jurisdiction, and the article suggests higher standards for choice of law determina-
tions. Id. at 779.
185, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
[Vol. 39
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the forum would be convenient if purposeful availment applies,
then the forum will be inconvenient if purposeful availment does
not apply. The forum may be very convenient if the state line is
only blocks away, even if the defendant has not availed itself of
any benefits from the forum. Factors such as distance and the
nature of the defendant's enterprise are the real determinants of
convenience. Purposeful availment is merely a possible positive
indicator.
C. Theoretical Developments That Bear on Purposeful
Availment
It is no secret that the theoretical foundations of purposeful
availment have developed in the thirty years since the pur-
poseful availment requirement appeared.
1. Developments Pertaining to State Sovereignty Theory
A change-either transparently profound or profoundly
transparent-has taken place with respect to the sovereignty
doctrine. The major aspects of this development are the applica-
tion of a minimum contacts test to assertions of in rem jurisdic-
tion in Shaffer v. Heitner,186 the integration of sovereignty the-
ory into the idea of federalism in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v Woodson,187 and the rejection of federalism as a permissible
jurisdictional consideration in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.88
Shaffer v. Heitner did some violence to Pennoyer v. Neff's
first principle of state sovereignty. The Court held that mini-
mum contacts must exist between the defendants and the forum
state in an action against directors of a corporation begun by
attachment of certificates of stock they owned. 8" The law of the
forum state, Delaware, provided that Delaware was the situs of
all stock issued by companies incorporated there.190 Therefore,
the plaintiffs initiated a derivative action against the corpora-
tion's directors by sequestering the directors' stock and awaiting
186. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
187. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
188. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
189. 433 U.S. at 212.
190. Id. at 192.
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their appearance or default. 1 ' The Court, however, ruled that
Pennoyer's first principle, that the forum has unquestionable
authority over all persons and things within its territorial
boundaries, was undercut by subsequent decisions requiring the
forum to give reasonable notice to the persons and the owners of
property in question. 92 Shaffer also held that when a state exer-
cises jurisdiction over property it is actually exercising jurisdic-
tion over the interests of the property owner, and therefore, the
proper test for the permissible exercise of jurisdiction was the
minimum contacts test.' Shaffer overruled Pennoyer and its
progeny to the extent they were inconsistent with these ideas. 94
International Shoe, of course, had overruled no cases. Its
minimum contacts test, as suggested above, relates to state sov-
ereignty doctrine and to fairness ideas. Shaffer eradicated the
first Pennoyer principle. By placing all exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test, however, it
may have been reinforcing the second Pennoyer principle, that
no state may exercise jurisdiction beyond its borders. 95 Interna-
tional Shoe, while not destroying sovereignty doctrine, reread
the doctrine as imposing fairness and convenience requirements.
If these requirements are read to supersede sovereignty ideas,
Shaffer might be viewed as imposing universal requirements of
fairness and convenience, but doing nothing more. 6
Just as Hanson punctured this fairness-only idea thirteen
years after International Shoe,'9 7 World-Wide did so again, just
191. Id.
192, Id. at 206. The Court relied on Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962), Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956), and Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
193. 433 U.S. at 207.
194. Id. at 212 n.39.
195. See Jay, "Minimum Contacts" As a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction:
A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 466-67 (1981) ("Shaffer is a disappointing reminder
of the hold Pennoyer still exerts."); cf. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 75-76 (1978) (questioning the extent of Shaffer's eradication of
the physical power basis of jurisdiction).
196. See Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 420-21 (1981) (contending that Shaffer imposed
"reasonableness" test and rejected mere "power" test). The Shaffer Court trivialized
Hanson by relegating it to the end of a long footnote otherwise concerned with establish-
ing the identity of power over property and power over owners of property. This treat-
ment provides further support for this interpretation.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
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three years after Shaffer. World-Wide made clear that: "[e]ven
if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State
S. ., the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of inter-
state federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment." 19 Although Hanson placed
its emphasis on "territorial limitations on the power" of
states,199-anguage that evokes the old image of sover-
eignty-World-Wide cited Hanson for "the principles of inter-
state federalism embodied in the Constitution."2 °0 The Court,
however, did not shy away from using the word "sovereignty": it
repeatedly used sovereignty to explain that in the system of in-
terstate federalism the authority of each state limits the author-
ity of all the other states.2 1 The Court made clear that it in-
tended to return to the principles embodied in the Hanson
opinion,1°2 principles derived from traditional sovereignty rea-
soning.20 3 The Court gave a federalism rationale to sovereignty.
The traditional sovereignty ideas, if not the "the first principles
of justice, '20 4 nevertheless were said to promote "the orderly ad-
198. 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958)) (emphasis
added).
199. 357 U.S. at 251; see id. at 254.
200. 444 U.S. at 293.
201. The Court stated:
[T]he Framers. . . intended that the States retain many essential attributes of
sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their
courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sov-
ereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the
original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 293.
The Court distinguished this idea from the comparable idea of territorial limits on sover-
eign power in Pennoyer v. Neff, but did so in a backhanded way that suggested the same
results might obtain if Pennoyer were applied:
Hence, even while abandoning the shibboleth that "It]he authority of every
tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which
it is established," we emphasized that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdic-
tion over the defendant must be assessed "in the context of our federal system
of government," and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only
fairness, but also the "orderly administration of the laws."
Id. at 293-94 (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) and International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945), respectively) (citations omitted).
202. See id. at 294 (quoting extensively from Hanson).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 171-81.
204. 95 U.S. at 732.
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ministration of the laws"20 by preventing the states from inter-
fering with each others' prerogatives to assert their own sover-
eign power to adjudicate cases. One might question whether the
states, in these days of overcrowded dockets, really want to hear
all the cases they might have a claim to.20° One might also won-
der whether the Court's reasoning implies that each case has
some correct forum,2 07 rather than any forum that the plaintiff
chooses where all defendants have minimum contacts. Because
of the next development in the theory, however, these questions
need not be answered.
Only two years after coronating the federalism-sovereignty
concept, the Court dealt the concept a "[s]ummary [e]xecution[]
by [f]ootnote." 20 s In Insurance Corp. of Ireland the Court stated
that federalism does not restrict the territorial jurisdiction of the
states.209 Restrictions on state jurisdiction are "not. . . a matter
of sovereignty," but "ultimately [are] a function of the individ-
ual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. ' 210 The
205. 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
206. See Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 924 (1985).
207. A correct forum would be one in which adjudication causes the least violence to
the respective claims of the various states that might have jurisdiction to assert power
over it. This notion is totally contrary to the ordinary way of evaluating jurisdictional
objections, which seeks not to identify some optimal forum, but rather to determine
whether the forum that the plaintiff has chosen satisfies some minimum due process test.
After International Shoe the applicable test has been minimum contacts. To the extent
that this emanation of World-Wide undermines the Court's prior position, so do the
arguments of some critics that the Court ignored the interests of Oklahoma in providing
a forum for enforcement of its safety laws. Cf. McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a
Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1, 55 (1982) (listing interests of
Oklahoma in the litigation); Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Juris-
diction of the State Courts: Time for a Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 505 (1984) (also
listing interests of Oklahoma). If Oklahoma's interests are defeated by the Court's ruling,
they would have been equally defeated by the plaintiffs' decision, for their own conve-
nience or other reasons, to sue in another forum that meets the minimum jurisdictional
standards. Unless one eliminates the rule of plaintiff's choice within minimum jurisdic-
tional standards, no interests can be guaranteed except those of the parties and those
that overlap perfectly with them. So far, no one has proposed elimination of the rule of
plaintiff's choice of forum.
208. Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction
in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 709 (1983).
209. 456 U.S. at 702-03 & n.10.
210. Id. at 702-03. This idea has received its fullest expression in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 709, 806-08 (1985), which, in considering the territorial jurisdic-
tion considerations applicable to plaintiff class members involuntarily present in a class
action, equates the due process rights to which plaintiff class members are entitled with
40
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Court affirmed a lower court order that had found the defendant
foreign insurance companies subject to personal jurisdiction as a
sanction for their failure to respond to discovery regarding their
contacts with the forum. The Court stressed that personal juris-
diction objections may be waived. Although defendants made ju-
risdictional defenses in the district court, the Court found the
failure to obey the legitimate orders of the court under the dis-
covery rules constituted a waiver of these objections.
The idea of the defendants' waiver of jurisdictional objec-
tions gave the Court pause about federalism. The Court felt that
if federalism were the basis for restrictions on territorial juris-
diction, a defendant would not be able to waive the objection.
The defendant would be giving up a protection that runs in
favor of the state, not merely in favor of itself. Persuaded by the
due process clause's2 1 failure to mention federalism concerns,
the Court avoided the waiver problem by holding that individual
liberty, not federalism, was at issue in personal jurisdiction
matters.21 s
Most commentators have viewed this ruling as sweeping
away all vestiges of both sovereignty and federalism theory.213
Although they may be correct, there are still reasons to doubt
this view. Federalism and sovereignty will continue to exert a
practical influence because of the Court's insistence that there
remains a requirement that "the maintenance of the suit ...
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
the procedural due process rights which apply to any adjudication. One recent article,
without discussing Shutts, contends that the due process at issue in territorial jurisdic-
tion disputes is substantive, rather than procedural. Perdue, supra note 8, at 508 &
n.183. This contention is based partially on the idea that the mere assertion of jurisdic-
tion is not a deprivation of life, liberty, or property sufficient to bring procedural due
process into play. The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that procedural due
process operates to prevent final deprivations of due process: the interest of the pro-
tected person need not be terminated before the Court will impose procedural due pro-
cess protections. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-37 (1982)
(predeprivation remedy ordered in appeal of writ of prohibition whose operation de-
prived person of protected interest); see also Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806-08 (reviewing pro-
cedural due process claim without reference to final disposition of case).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Pennoyer v. Neff held that the due process clause
was the ultimate authority on which the Court restricts the personal jurisdiction of the
states. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
212. 456 U.S. at 702-03 & n.10.
213. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 208, at 726; Weintraub, supra note 207, at 504-05.
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tice.' ,,214 Sovereignty and to some degree federalism have deter-
mined the expectations of being subject to suit that form the
"traditional notions" the Court wants to apply.215 Thus, the
courts will continue to apply sovereignty principles whether they
admit it or not.
2 16
On a more theoretical level, sovereignty need not be
equated with federalism despite World- Wide's reasoning and
the sweeping language of Insurance Corp. of Ireland. Although
the Court correctly noted that an individual is unable to waive
the nonforum states' federalism interests,217 a different waiver
rule may apply to the nonforum state's sovereignty interests.
Sovereignty interests might be tied to protection of the state's
citizens.21 It would be a violation of the nonforum state's sover-
eignty when another state asserts jurisdiction over its citizens,
but only if the citizens did not consent to the assertion. Sover-
eignty also might be more closely tied to a legitimate exercise of
authority.21 The nonforum state's authority is offended only if
its citizens have done nothing to subject themselves to the au-
thority of the forum state. To the extent that the word sover-
eignty applies to these interests, a system that upholds these in-
terests can properly apply a waiver rule.
Buttressing this position are consent theories-those based
214. 456 U.S. at 703 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
215. See supra text accompanying note 169.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 269-71.
217. These interests would be either in trying the case or in preserving the inter-
state order by having the state with the best sovereignty claim try the case. 456 U.S. at
702 n.10.
218. One commentator argues that the state's interest in protecting its citizens over-
laps totally with the interest of the citizens themselves. Thus, the sovereignty considera-
tion is unnecessary, for citizens can avoid jurisdiction wherever it is proper by asserting
their own liberty interests. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 69
IOWA L. REv. 1015, 1051 (1983). The validity of this argument depends on the content of
the protections that the jurisdictional rules afford the citizens' liberty interests. It is con-
ceivable that the state could be offended by an assertion of jurisdiction that offends its
citizens, but is not so unfair as to amount to a violation of the citizens' due process
rights. Moreover, even if the rights of the state and the citizen both originate in due
process, due process may have different meanings for a state than it has for an individ-
ual. Therefore, the rights of the state and its citizens need not be coextensive. This latter
argument would be even more persuasive if the state's interest has another source such
as the full faith and credit clause.
219. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion
and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 564, 569 (1981).
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on prelitigation and litigation waivers of jurisdictional objec-
tions-which flourished at the same time that the sovereignty
theory was at its height. If any inconsistency existed between
upholding sovereignty and permitting the foreign defendant, by
its conduct, to make itself subject to the court's sovereignty,
neither Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley220
nor Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association221 rec-
ognized it.
Nonetheless, the problem of the due process clause still ex-
ists. Just as it fails to mention federalism, it also fails to mention
sovereignty.22 One possible solution is to focus on the full faith
and credit clause223 and find in its terms or its application re-
strictions on personal jurisdiction that will preserve sovereignty
interests. Before Pennoyer, courts imposing restrictions on terri-
torial jurisdiction did so by refusing to afford full faith and
credit to judgments obtained by overreaching state courts.2 24
The full faith and credit clause relates to the ordering of rela-
tions among states. It would, therefore, seem natural to limit the
clauses's application by the sovereignty principle, a principle
that would uphold the "fair and orderly administration of the
laws" by the states in the federal system. Indeed, Professor
Rheinstein made just this argument in a 1955 article.225
Just as the due process clause makes no mention of sover-
eignty, however, neither does the full faith and credit clause list
220. 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
221. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
222. One commentator has taken issue with Insurance Corp. of Ireland and argues
that a violation of state sovereignty does harm personal liberty interests protected by
due process. He argues that due process protects a defendant's freedom from an unre-
lated sovereign. See Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 413-16 (1985); cf. Stein, supra note 8, at 748-50 (1987) (expressing the
position that sovereignty was thought to limit jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of
the due process clause and this ought to influence its interpretation). Due process, how-
ever, traditionally has not been thought to have such a content, and no such idea can be
derived from any of the opinions in which the Court has expounded on the general
meaning of the term. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a more
detailed refutation of Professor Weisburd's supporting arguments, see Perdue, supra
note 8, at 511 n.199.
223. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
224. Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHi. L. REv. 775,
793 & n.77 (1955) (collecting cases).
225. Id. at 795.
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exceptions. If one adheres to the text of the Constitution, the
basis for an exception to the full faith and credit obligation must
be in the document. The due process clause is there, but state
sovereignty is not.
226
On a more mundane note, giving a different content to the
requirements of territorial jurisdiction under due process (indi-
vidual liberty interests of the defendant) from that given under
full faith and credit (sovereignty interests of the nonforum
states) means that some judgments upheld and enforced within
the state of issuance would be denied enforcement by any other
jurisdiction.227 This result would greatly detract from the finality
226. Rheinstein argues that sovereignty is not explicitly found in the Constitution
because it is implicitly present:
[A]t the time of the making of the Constitution . . . the idea obtained that
there existed a ius gentium in the sense of a legal order common to all Chris-
tendom and that this order imposed on all member nations the duty so to
confine their legislative, judicial and other activities that all nations could live
together in an orderly community.... This notion has been made a part and
parcel of the full faith and credit clause, which would be meaningless without
it. It is in the full faith and credit clause that the Supreme Court is to find the
constitutional directive and authorization in detail to determine the spatial
confines by which the powers of the several states are delimited against each
other. It is also by the incorporation of the idea of the existence of a ius gen-
tium in the full faith and credit clause that the Court must implement it so
that the several states can harmoniously live and operate together in the
framework of the national union.
Id. at 816.
For all its rhetorical power, this argument lacks support in the constitutional text. There
is a similar difficulty with Professor Weisburd's arguments that territorial sovereignty is
so obvious in the structure of the Union that the written Constitution fails to mention it,
and that the Constitution's main focus is the power and structure of the federal govern-
ment, not the states. Weisburd, supra note 222, at 377. The document does address in-
terstate relations in article IV. Article IV requires full faith and credit, imposes the duty
to afford privileges and immunities, and requires extradition of criminal suspects and
fugitive slaves. None of these matters was so obvious as to not make it into the Constitu-
tion. Professor Brilmayer contends that sovereignty is tied to political legitimacy and
must exist independent of fairness concerns to limit jurisdiction. Brihnayer, supra note
43, at 296. Her analogy is to unconsented to arbitration, which, however fair, still of-
fends. Id. at 297. To the extent that judicial decisionmaking is a component of the expec-
tations that constitute subjectively fair treatment, however, such arbitration would be
forbidden under fairness-oriented ideas of due process. See infra text accompanying
notes 265-67. Her argument that either the full faith and credit clause or due process
clause provides a basis for sovereignty ideas, Brilmayer, supra note 43 at 313 is vulnera-
ble to the same critique as Rheinstein's and Weisburd's Theories. As a matter of stare
decisis, her arguments are irrelevant by Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03 &
n.10, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.13 (1985), and Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809-11. Regard-
ing the last of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 250-56.
227. If this were not so, then the individual liberty and sovereignty tests really
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of judgments, creating costly uncertainty over whether an asser-
tion of jurisdiction that had been unsuccessfully resisted
through various levels of appeal within the forum and up to the
Supreme Court might nevertheless fail when enforcement of the
judgment is sought elsewhere. By adding one more line of de-
fense against assertions of jurisdiction, it might also encourage
the expenditure of litigation resources that would be better
spent, from the perspective of both the parties and the inter-
ested states, on the merits of the case.
2. Developments Pertaining to Theories Based on Fairness
and Convenience
If it has taken place, the elimination of the sovereignty-fed-
eralism theory would leave only ideas of fairness and conve-
nience guiding determinations of appropriate personal jurisdic-
tion. If fairness in the sense of convenience is the only
touchstone for jurisdiction, the potential for changes in current
doctrine are tremendous. For one thing, state lines fade into ir-
relevance. 228 Available resources aside, distance determines the
ease of litigation; it is far more convenient for a Manhattan resi-
dent to defend a suit in Newark than in Buffalo, even if the
Manhattanite never even looked across the Hudson River
before.2 9 Apart from the fairness of reciprocity, the only reason
the identity of the state might retain significance is if the fair-
ness test looks to the interests of the forum state in adjudicating
the litigation. Such an approach does not necessarily hinge on a
would be unnecessary, and sovereignty would be redundant. Professor Rheinstein argues
that the disparity in outcomes would take place, and appears to view it as an advantage,
permitting migratory divorce decrees to be effective when they are harmless. Rheinstein,
supra note 224, at 818.
228. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 8, at 510.
229. The Court misleads in its statement in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985),
that "modern transportation and communications have made it much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity." It
may still be prohibitively costly for the small business in Georgia that has activities in
Jacksonville, Florida, to defend in Miami, 400 miles farther to the south. It may not be
unfair in the sense of reciprocity, but it is unfair in the sense of reasonable ability to
defend. Under state venue rules this hypothetical does not occur very often, but restric-
tive state venue rules are not universal, nor are they generally recognized as required by
the due process limits that control territorial jurisdiction. See Stein, supra note 8, at 705
n.76.
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sovereignty theory. Even if sovereign power is not the issue, fair-
ness might still require a particular state to assert its govern-
mental interests in a given lawsuit. Although this approach has
its difficulties,230 the Supreme Court has recognized it,23 1 and
some distinguished commentators have incorporated it into their
fairness theories.232 The Court, however, has not said that fair-
ness in the sense of convenience, reciprocity, or preservation of
legitimate interests is all that is left to matters of territorial ju-
risdiction. Moreover, because the purposeful availment test and
the concept of foreseeability linked to it both incorporate sover-
eignty considerations,233 the results of these cases have not re-
flected any doctrinal revolution. The major cases decided after
Insurance Corp. of Ireland demonstrate both the Court's refusal
to rely overtly on sovereignty or federalism, and the Court's con-
tinued insistence on tests incorporating sovereignty ideas, albeit
with an occasional attempt to explain these tests in fairness
terms.
2 34
230. See supra note 207.
231. 471 U.S. at 473; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
232. E.g., McDougal, supra note 207, at 20 (1982); Redish, supra note 169, at 1139-
41 (1981); Weintraub, supra note 207, at 524 (1984).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 160-71 (purposeful availment) and infra
text accompanying notes 270-71 (foreseeability).
234. This analysis places to one side Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Kee-
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). Keeton focused largely on the prob-
lem of personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs and did not develop new ideas on the appro-
priate test for defendants. Although Calder focused on defendants, it addressed the issue
of defendants protected by the first amendment to the Constitution; it did little to de-
velop the doctrine of personal jurisdiction over defendants in general. To the extent that
these cases do apply the purposeful availment requirement, they are briefly summarized
elsewhere in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 107-115. Another arguably
major case that nevertheless contributed little doctrinal development is Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), which involved an action against
a Colombian transportation company to recover for the death of American workers killed
in a Peruvian helicopter accident. The Court stressed that the defendant lacked mini-
mum contacts with the forum state and applied an apparently stricter standard than it
might otherwise apply, on the ground that the cause of action was not alleged to have
arisen out of contacts the defendant had with the forum. Comparing the defendant's
contacts to those in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), an
analogous case in which jurisdiction was found proper, and Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), an analogous but pre-minimum contacts case in
which jurisdiction was held improper, the Court found that Rosenberg was the closer
comparison and denied jurisdiction. 466 U.S. at 418. The Court quoted the language
"fair play and substantial justice," but without any exploration of the words beyond the
minimum contacts test itself. Id. at 414 (quoting both International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Like-
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Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 235 and Asahi Metal Indus-
try Co. v. Superior Court236 applied a two-part minimum con-
tacts test in which purposeful availment and convenience are ad-
dressed separately. In Burger King the Court appeared to justify
the purposeful availment requirement in terms of the fairness of
reciprocity23 7 and convenience, not sovereignty and federal-
ism.2 38 After establishing this fairness rationale, however, the
Court appeared to set up the purposeful availment requirement
as an absolute test. This barrier operates irrespective of the fair-
ness considerations present in the particular case. "Once it has
been decided that a defendant purposefully established mini-
mum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play
wise, the Court stated that the relevant contacts could not be those created by the "uni-
lateral activity" of another defendant or a third party, thus applying the purposeful
availment standard and quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 466 U.S. at 417.
The Court, however, gave no clue that it might consciously have been applying ideas of
state sovereignty or federalism.
235. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). The case was an action by Burger King Corporation to
enforce a franchise agreement with a Michigan franchisee. Burger King sued in federal
court in Florida. The Supreme Court held that the Florida court had jurisdiction over
the Michigan defendant because in his dealings with the franchise he purposefully estab-
lished minimum contacts with Florida.
236. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
237. The Court stated:
[W]here individuals "purposefully derive benefit" from their interstate activi-
ties, it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other
States for consequences that may arise proximately from such activities. The
Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid
interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.
471 U.S. at 474 (citation omitted). See generally supra text accompanying notes 33-34
(discussing reciprocity theme in purposeful availment). It should be noted that Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), foreshadowed establishment of this clear reciprocity ration-
ale for purposeful availment. The plaintiff argued that the corporate director defendants
had received the benefits of the Delaware corporate laws. Without mentioning sover-
eignty, the Court answered by saying that the directors had insufficient knowledge re-
garding vulnerability to jurisdiction to meet the purposeful availment requirement which
would make the implication of consent to jurisdiction fair. Id. at 216.
238. The Court stated:
[B]ecause "modern transportation and communications have made it much
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity," it usually will not be unfair to subject him to the bur-
dens of litigating in another forum for disputes relating to such activity.
471 U.S. at 474 (citation omitted).
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and substantial justice.' "239 Convenience and the state's fairness
interest in reciprocity are to be considered only at this second
phase.
Courts in appropriate cases may evaluate the burden on the
defendant, ... the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, ... the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief,. . . the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
the shared interest of the several States in furthering funda-
mental substantive social policies.
240
If these factors militate in favor of jurisdiction, however, a lesser
showing of purposefully created contacts may sometimes suf-
fice.241 Similarly, the fact that the defendant has "purposefully
directed his activities at forum residents" will suffice unless the
defendant makes a showing that the exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable and that rules such as choice of law and venue
cannot be applied to make it reasonable.
2 42
Thus, from a doctrinal viewpoint, as of 1985, fairness justi-
fied the imposition of the purposeful availment requirement, but
the requirement would still bar jurisdiction in some cases in
which convenience and other explicit fairness factors militated
in favor of the forum state adjudicating the case.243 Even though
fairness considerations might be implicit in the purposeful avail-
ment requirement, these same considerations taken indepen-
dently might still bar jurisdiction when purposeful availment is
present.244
Asahi applied the purposeful availment test as a threshold
requirement and then examined fairness in the sense of conve-
nience for the defendant and the importance of the forum state's
interest. In other words, Asahi used the same method as Burger
King. The plurality opinion and Justice Brennan's concurrence
differed on the outcome of the purposeful availment require-
239. Id. at 476 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320
(1945)) (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1980)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 478.
[Vol. 39
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ment.245 Neither opinion, however, explored the doctrinal basis
of purposeful availment. No reference was made to sovereignty,
and the fairness rationale was not developed. The Court dis-
cussed-and disagreed about-the extent of purposeful activity,
benefit received, and foreseeability of suit necessary to meet the
requirement.246 With respect to the independent requirement of
fairness, or reasonableness, the majority opinion did little to
elaborate on Burger King. Without repeating or even referring
to the statements in Burger King establishing that a showing of
purposeful availment supports jurisdiction unless the defendant
makes a compelling case that jurisdiction is unfair, and that a
strong showing of fairness might permit jurisdiction upon a
lesser showing of purposefully created contacts, the Court listed
the following reasonableness factors:
A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the inter-
ests of the forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies; and the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.1
1 7
As applied in Asahi, the factors included an assessment of the
forum state's and the cross-plaintiff's interests in conducting the
litigation in the forum. 248 These interests were minimal in light
of the indemnity nature of the claim and the foreign nationality
of both parties. 249 Doctrinally, the two step test reigned su-
preme, with purposeful availment-its rationale unex-
plained-as the threshold requirement before fairness considera-
tions even enter the picture. The possibility of some balancing of
the two parts of the test remains a line in the Burger King
opinion.
One further case ought to be noted on this topic. In Phillips
245. - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031-33, 1035-37, 1038 (1987).
246. Id. See generally supra text accompanying notes 124-37 (discussing case).
247. 107 S. Ct. at 1034 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
248. Id. at 1034.
249. Id. The foreign nationality of the parties, said the Court, called for an even
more cautious approach to asserting jurisdiction than might be appropriate with domes-
tic defendants, in light of possible interference with federal foreign policy interests. Id.
at 1035.
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Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 250 a 1985 case, the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of a Kansas court over out-of-state plaintiff class
members in an action to recover unpaid mineral rights royalties.
The Court accepted the idea that the absent plaintiffs had due
process rights like those of defendants. The Court, however,
pointed to the minimal risks and burdens of the class members,
in contrast to the substantial burdens of expense and effort im-
posed on a nonresident defendant. 51 The Court also stressed the
class members' due process protections such as notice, the right
to opt out, and court scrutiny of the representative party.252
Thus, the Court considered the nonresident plaintiffs to be
in the same situation as nonresident defendants with respect to
their jurisdictional objection. In evaluating the objection, how-
ever, the Court applied a procedural due process analysis drawn
from other areas of the law. The Court questioned whether a
valuable property right was at stake, 53 assessed the detriment to
the plaintiff's rights that would occur if adjudication took place
in the challenged manner, 254 and questioned whether alternate
safeguards afforded by the existing procedure satisfied fairness
concerns, or whether additional safeguards needed to be
added.255 The Court, therefore, merged territorial jurisdiction
doctrine with conventional due process, fair hearing doctrine. 56
Presumably, purposeful availment would have no place in such a
regime except to the extent that it related to fairness ideas.
Strangely, the Shutts opinion does not seem to have had much
impact. Burger King and Asahi applied the conventional, sover-
eignty-based purposeful availment requirement.
250. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). For a detailed description of the case, see supra note 119.
251. 472 U.S. at 808-09.
252. Id. at 809-11.
253. Id. at 807.
254. Id. at 809-10.
255. Id. at 810-14 (emphasizing rights of notice and opting out of the class, while
rejecting as too inefficient a proposed requirement that the class members affirmatively
opt into the class).
256. Id. at 807 (explaining minimum contacts test solely on the basis of fairness).
Professor Brilmayer appears to disagree with this merger. Brilmayer, supra note 43, at
296. But her article does not discuss the point in the specific context of Shutts.
864 [Vol. 39
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IV. AN EVALUATION OF PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT
A. The Death of State Sovereignty
1. The Mortality of Consent
Sovereignty is indeed dead as an explicit basis for limiting
state territorial jurisdiction.257 Since its manifestation as federal-
ism in 1980, sovereignty has not returned and its demise was
confirmed in 1985.258 With the end of the sovereignty doctrine,
purposeful availment has been cut loose from its origins.259 Con-
sent, one idea on which purposeful availment is based, collapses
when there is no ground to oppose jurisdiction. If there is no
basis for resistance, there is no occasion for consent.260 Thus,
purposeful availment as a manifestation of consent seems
irrelevant.
2. The Irrelevance of Presence
Presence, the other basis of purposeful availment, has also
become obsolete. One need not ask whether the defendant is
present in the borders of the jurisdiction anymore. The question
is whether it is fair to require the defendant's presence in the
action. Purposeful availment as proof of presence is beside the
point. Reasons other than its relation to the original doctrine
must be found to justify the purposeful availment requirement.
257. See Lewis, supra note 208, at 699 (1983).
258. The Court stated: "Although this protection operates to restrict state power, it
'must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause' rather than as a function 'of federalism concerns.'" Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985) (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701-03 n.10 (1982)).
259. See supra text accompanying note 43.
260. The relation of purposeful availment to consent demonstrates the oddity of
purposeful availment's current function in territorial jurisdiction disputes. If purposeful
availment is a manifestation of consent, one would expect to see it embraced whenever
jurisdiction is approved, but not necessarily mentioned when jurisdiction is denied. Even
under the strictest sovereignty theory, the absence of purposeful availment, like the ab-
sence of consent, does not imply the absence of adequate grounds for jurisdiction. If
sovereignty were to have another resurrection, either the nonsovereignty function of pur-
poseful availment would justify its status as an absolute requirement, or purposeful
availment would become solely a consideration for granting jurisdiction.
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B. The Function of Purposeful Availment in the Absence of
Sovereignty
1. Fairness to the Forum: Reciprocity
To the extent that purposeful availment serves a fairness
role by imposing reciprocity, its use to deny jurisdiction is an
example of the converse proposition fallacy.261 If a defendant
has deliberately benefited from the forum's laws, then the fo-
rum's exercise of jurisdiction may seem fair. The fact that the
defendant has not benefited, however, does not make the exer-
cise of jurisdiction unfair. It might be eminently fair, in the
sense ordinary people view fairness, to force a defendant to cross
a state line to appear in court, if the distance is close,262 the
stake in the lawsuit nominal,263 or the fairness to others over-
whelming. Indeed, in such a situation, in which fairness is the
only concern, the presence of the state line is irrelevant.6 4
Arguably, assigning any relevance to state lines, even for the
purpose of granting jurisdiction on a reciprocity theory, is an un-
conscious use of state sovereignty doctrine. If the state does not
have sovereign authority that affects territorial jurisdiction dis-
putes, how can relations with the sovereign authority create a
reciprocal obligation that determines any particular dispute?
Stated differently, the question is whether due process in the
sense of fairness (rather than in the discredited sense of federal-
ism or sovereignty) nevertheless embodies the idea of an obliga-
tion to a governmental authority based on voluntary conduct
that accrues benefits from the law enforcement activity of that
authority. With respect to the easiest cases, a consensus proba-
bly would be present that it does. Thus, if the plaintiff files suit
in the forum and defendant asserts a counterclaim, consensus
ideas of fairness would preclude the plaintiff from contending
that the assertion of jurisdiction over the counterclaim is un-
fair.26 5 Perhaps even this easiest case embodies sovereignty no-
261. See generally supra note 260 (making same argument with respect to use of
purposeful availment as an indication of consent under a regime of state sovereignty).
262. See supra text accompanying note 185.
263. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 263 (1958); see also supra text ac-
companying note 34.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
265. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). In that case the Court held:
[Vol. 39
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tions, but to the extent it does, the prevailing subjective idea of
fairness does as well. Therefore, even if fairness is defined as the
imposition of procedures that are not "arbitrary or unreasona-
ble," requiring a party to submit to a forum from which that
party has demanded relief meets the test.2 61 Obviously, one may
postulate cases as difficult as Asahi, but it should be possible to
extend the subjective fairness analysis to any of these, and the
benefit the defendant derives from the laws and legal protec-
tions of the forum should retain some significance.8 7
2. Fairness to the Defendant: Foreseeability
The foreseeability criterion for territorial jurisdiction deci-
sions is circular: whatever the jurisdictional rule is, the rule will
trigger expectations that will then determine foreseeability. 28
Had World-Wide gone the other way, dealers and wholesalers of
autos would expect to be subject to suit in any forum state into
which their cars are driven.8 9 The foreseeability on which the
Court relied in Shaffer v. Heitner,2 70 World-Wide, and the sub-
There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from adopt-
ing a procedure by which a judgment in personam may be rendered in a cross-
action against a plaintiff in its courts. . . . The plaintiff having, by his volun-
tary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating
him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires
his presence. It is the price the state may exact as the condition of opening
its courts to the plaintiff.
Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added).
266. See id.
267. Another sense of fairness to the forum is the fairness of upholding the forum's
interest in enforcing its law and providing an avenue of relief to its residents. Under
present doctrine, however, these matters are considered in a second step of minimum
contacts analysis conducted after purposeful availment has been met. To include them in
the purposeful availment calculation would be double counting, at least if the purposeful
availment requirement is rewritten as one that will support and not by itself forbid as-
sertions of jurisdiction. Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (describing special
jurisdictional protections for reporters in libel actions as a form of double counting when
special protections exist on the determination of the merits).
268. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 195, at 443 (1981); Stein, supra note 8, at 701 (1987).
269. The Court in World-Wide relied strongly on foreseeability of being haled into
Court, separating the idea from foreseeability of injury. 444 U.S. 286, 295-98 (1980).
270. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (majority opinion), 217-19 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) was the first of the Court's cases to link purposeful availment with foresee-
ability in a clear fashion. World-Wide made the linkage even more explicit. 444 U.S. at
295-98.
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sequent cases, however, is not just the foreseeability that the
current rule will be applied. It is, instead, foreseeability based on
the accretion of all the territorial jurisdiction decisions of the
past, without regard to the rules that these cases employed.1
7 1
This gives foreseeability some content besides its own circular-
ity. That content, however, is necessarily the discredited notion
of state sovereignty, the fundamental basis for territorial juris-
diction caselaw from Pennoyer to International Shoe, and its
supplemental basis, intermittently, from Hanson to Insurance
Corp. of Ireland. Using expectations formed in the era of sover-
eignty doctrine may have some validity under the fairness ra-
tionale underlying the current approach to territorial jurisdic-
tion. Perhaps, like reciprocity, expectations formed by the old
sovereignty cases have become so tied to subjective ideas of
which procedures are fair that a significant departure from what
was permissible under sovereignty doctrine would trigger mod-
ern outrage. Unlike reciprocity, expectations would, under this
theory, be both a positive and a negative factor in the jurisdic-
tional determination. Not only would one's vulnerability to an
assertion of jurisdiction under the old rules make an assertion of
jurisdiction now seem fair (because the old rules make it foresee-
able), but also one's immunity from jurisdiction under old prece-
dents might evoke a sense of unfairness if jurisdiction is asserted
now (because the old rules make it unforseeable). This reasoning
based on expectations will not be true in every case. Other fac-
tors such as distance or the poverty of the defendant might still
make defense of the case so difficult that, whatever the defend-
ant's reasonable expectations, it would appear unfair to make
him or her litigate in the forum. In addition, a host of factors
might make the assertion of jurisdiction seem fair whatever the
defendant's expectations. Such factors might include conve-
nience to the defendant, convenience to the other parties, judi-
cial economy, absence of a significant stake in the suit, or great
resources for defending.
3. Fairness to the Defendant: Convenience
Purposeful availment of the forum's benefits and protec-
271. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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tions may indicate proximity or low cost in defending an action
there. It is probably a better indicator than gross mileage. Once
again, however, the converse proposition does not necessarily
hold. Just because a person has not taken the benefits and pro-
tections of the forum's laws does not mean it is inconvenient for
the person to defend there. If the forum is very close and getting
there is inexpensive, the forum is convenient, period. Thus, pur-
poseful availment works as a positive indicator of convenience,
but should not be employed as a negative indicator.
Of course, even as a positive indicator, purposeful availment
is far from perfect. The requirement necessarily focuses on the
past, the ties and relations that have been created from which
the defendant has derived benefit. But convenience looks to the
present and the future. If the defendant has severed all the ties
and abandoned all the relations that give rise to an inference of
convenience, litigation now might be very difficult for reasons of
distance and cost, despite the past benefits from the forum.
2 72
4. General Observations on the Use of Fairness Rationales
for Restriction of Territorial Jurisdiction
Due process doctrine has few absolute rules. Although
"[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the oppor-
tunity to be heard, 2 73 the Supreme Court has tolerated proce-
dures that make defense at the hearing extremely difficult. The
Court has approved the imposition of filing fees in actions by
indigents to appeal reductions of welfare benefits.274 It has ap-
proved the denial of legal aid in custody determinations when
the parents of the child could not afford a lawyer .2 7 These cost
barriers are much more likely to frustrate the right to be heard
than imposing the cost of traveling to a distant jurisdiction on a
defendant who has some financial resources.
With Insurance Corp. of Ireland and, to an even greater ex-
tent, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Court has made clear
that the territorial jurisdiction determination is just one more
272. See Perdue, supra note 8, at 510.
273. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (quot-
ing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
274. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
275. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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aspect of procedural due process. But unlike other aspects of
procedural due process in which the burden on the individual
claiming greater rights to be heard is balanced against other in-
terests, including those of the entity providing the hearing,
2"7
the territorial jurisdiction determination has one absolute: pur-
poseful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum's
laws must exist before a court will consider the forum's interest,
the defendant's burden, and the other interests at stake. Al-
though a purposeful availment inquiry has some justification in
determining the fairness of a given assertion of jurisdiction, im-
posing an absolute requirement of purposeful availment does
not appear to be justified.
C. Minimum Contacts with a Diminished Role for
Purposeful Availment
Close study of purposeful availment, thus, supports a
greatly diminished role for the requirement. Rather than stand-
ing as an absolute barrier to jurisdiction, a role that it would not
occupy even in a system based on strict territorial sovereignty,
purposeful availment should be only one of several factors going
into a determination whether an assertion of jurisdiction com-
ports with due process. The presence of purposeful availment
should be of greater consequence than its absence, but in neither
case should it be an absolute test. Purposefully created contacts,
like other contacts, will generally count in favor of jurisdiction
to the extent that they indicate convenience and any aspects of
foreseeability of suit that are absolutely basic to generally held
ideas of fairness. Purposefully created contacts will occupy a
unique role by establishing reciprocity with the forum state, an
aspect of fairness that is basic, but hardly absolute.
Of course, objections might be raised to such an approach.
276. The Court stated:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous determination of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
safeguards would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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An absolute test is thought to be easy to apply. The purposeful
availment requirement, however, has proven vexing in applica-
tion when applied as an absolute. Asahi is as a key example. The
Court stands split (four to one to four) over the requirement's
application to the unadorned facts of placement into the stream
of commerce of a mass produced item whose use gives rise to a
products liability action. The other half of the minimum con-
tacts test, that based on explicit consideration of convenience
and the interests of the forum and the parties, yielded near una-
nimity. Doubtless, the current two hurdles for attempted exer-
cises of jurisdiction-purposeful availment and fairness and con-
venience-mean that judges have a greater chance to reach the
same of result on similar facts. But this is simply because the
negative option gets two chances. The two chances, however, are
not independently justified as absolute barriers to assertion of
jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Scholars have called for any number of reforms of personal
jurisdiction. Some have called for a return to theories of state
sovereignty, 1 some have called for the abolition of the mini-
mum contacts test and the adoption of interest analysis27 8 or
something more vague,27 9 and some have called for hybrid tests
embodying both sovereignty and fairness considerations.280
The proposal here is much more modest. It is simply to de-
pose purposeful availment from the position it now occupies as a
threshold requirement for territorial jurisdiction. This approach
is supported by the history of purposeful availment in consent
doctrine, the history of sovereignty theory and its absence of
textual grounding in the Constitution, and the functional role
that purposeful availment might sensibly play in a regime based
on fairness. Further support is found in Shutts's equating of ter-
ritorial due process with ordinary procedural due process. Per-
haps this approach is also supported by Justice Brennan's dis-
277. Weisburd, supra note 222, at 377 (1985).
278. McDougal, supra note 207, at 1 (1982).
279. Greenstein, supra note 169, at 855 (1987) (idea of "themes"); Jay, supra note
195, at 429 (1981) (suggestion that coherent theory may not be possible).
280. Posnak, supra note 176, at 729 (1981).
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cussion of territorial jurisdiction in his opinion for the Court in
Burger King. In Burger King the Court reached the brink of bal-
ancing purposeful availment with other factors, and then
stepped back. It stated that considerations of the forum state's
interest, the plaintiff's interest, and the interstate judicial sys-
tem's interest "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness
of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of [purposefully created]
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required." '81
Had the Court's meaning permitted the omission of the
"purposefully created" language from the quotation, the Court
would have embraced the main idea of this Article. After all, it
would be hard to imagine that the considerations the Court
mentions would ever be present to a sufficient degree to satisfy
legitimate fairness concerns if there were "no contacts, ties, or
relations 282 between the defendant and the state.8s But they
might well satisfy these concerns in situations like Hanson or
World-Wide, which ignored them because of the threshold re-
quirement of purposeful availment. To the extent that these
cases relied explicitly on ideas of sovereignty, their authority
might be questionable in any event.28 4 At the very least, the sov-
ereignty reasoning of these opinions ought to be acknowledged
so that purposeful availment will no longer be a secret misappli-
cation of concepts now discredited, but instead an effort in fur-
therance of legitimate fairness goals.
281. 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
282. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
283. For a more negative view of the value of minimum contacts in general, see Jay,
supra note 195, at 475; McDougal, supra note 207, at 59-60. The approach suggested in
this Article would conserve both purposeful availment and minimum contacts precisely
to the extent that they serve legitimate fairness goals.
284. The Court, however, relied extensively on both cases in Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 444 U.S. 462, 472, 474-78, 480-81, 482 n.23, 486 & n.30 (1980) (majority opin-
ion), and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1031-
32, 1034, 1036-38, (1987) (plurality and concurring opinions).
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